full-disclosure - Bypassing the new /GS protection in VC++ 7.1

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <200508190438.j7J4cOxh014294@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Date: Fri Aug 19 05:38:37 2005
From: Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu (Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu)
Subject: Bypassing the new /GS protection in VC++ 7.1 

On Fri, 19 Aug 2005 12:17:25 +0800, leaf said:
> Hey,
> Buffer overflows will be harder and harder. Maybe game is over.

The game will never be over.  The best you can hope for is to find a
cost-effective way to raise the bar high enough to keep the likelyhood
that you'll get hacked down to an acceptable level.

Hint - the /GS code is based on an assumption regarding the behavior
of the code.  What is it assuming, and what possible end-runs can you
come up with? (For example, if the feature is based on a 'canary' value
remaining intact, you want to look for ways to totally overshoot the
canary and overlay something beyond it...)
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 226 bytes
Desc: not available
Url : http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/attachments/20050819/d8bd2cfb/attachment.bin