full-disclosure - Re: [SC-L] Re: [Owasp-dotnet] RE: 4 Questions: Latest IE vulnerability, Firefox vs IE security, User vs Admin risk profile, and browsers coded in 100% Managed Verifiable code

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Date: Thu Apr  6 16:38:58 2006
From: eaton.lists at gmail.com (Brian Eaton)
Subject: Re: [SC-L] Re: [Owasp-dotnet] RE: 4 Questions:
	Latest IE vulnerability, Firefox vs IE security,
	User vs Admin risk profile,
	and browsers coded in 100% Managed Verifiable code

On 4/5/06, Crispin Cowan <crispin@...ell.com> wrote:
> Pascal Meunier wrote:
> >  but as you posted an example profile with "capability setuid", I must
> > admit I am curious as to why an email client needs that.
> Well now that is a very good question, but it has nothing to do with
> AppArmor. The AppArmor learning mode just records the actions that the
> application performs. With or without AppArmor, the Thunderbird mail
> client is using cap_setuid. AppArmor gives you the opportunity to *deny*
> that capability, so you can try blocking it and find out. But for
> documentation on why Thunderbird needs it, you would have to look at
> mozilla.org not the AppArmor pages.

Does cap_setuid give a program enough authority to break out of the
AppArmor profile?

Regards,
Brian