full-disclosure - DNS poisoning

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Message-ID: <200606281557.k5SFvBdS012958@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Date: Wed Jun 28 16:57:20 2006
From: Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu (Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu)
Subject: DNS poisoning

On Tue, 27 Jun 2006 16:47:59 CDT, Saeed Abu Nimeh said:
> Is there a way to do dns poisoning and make the poisoned server provide
> legitimate queries when doing dns lookup. Example: Assume I am running a
> poisoned dns server, when user X does lookup yahoo.com or dig yahoo.com
> I reply with legit yahoo entries, however, when user Y does the same
> thing I provide fake or spoofed entires.

I haven't checked the BIND source, but it *might* be possible to poison
only one view in a split-view configuration.  However, your control over
who sees the poisoned entry would be limited to "any IP address who is served
the given view".

(Incidentally, you can't do "user X or user Y" for DNS, because the query packet
doesn't carry any such authentication - the best you can do is "by IP address".
This is a crucial but often overlooked distinction - users do *not* equate to
IP addresses)
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