Message-id: <20070221.iptel@psirt.cisco.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2007 17:09:11 -0000
From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team <psirt@...co.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Cc: psirt@...co.com
Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Unified IP
	Conference Station and IP Phone Vulnerabilities

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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Unified IP Conference Station and IP
Phone Vulnerabilities

Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20070221-phone

http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070221-phone.shtml

Revision 1.0

For Public Release 2007 February 21 1600 UTC (GMT)

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary
=======

Certain Cisco Unified IP Conference Station and IP Phone devices
contain vulnerabilities which may allow unauthorized users to gain
administrative access to vulnerable devices.

Cisco Unified IP Conference Station Administrative Bypass
Vulnerability

Cisco Unified IP Conference Station 7935 and 7936 devices do not
require a password when a URL is accessed directly via the
administrator HTTP interface. There is a workaround for this
vulnerability.

Cisco Unified IP Phone Default Account and Privilege Escalation
Vulnerabilities

Cisco Unified IP Phone 7906G, 7911G, 7941G, 7961G, 7970G and 7971G
devices contain a hard coded default user account with a default
password which is remotely accessible via a Secure Shell (SSH) server
enabled on the phone. This default user account may be leveraged to
gain administrative access to a vulnerable phone via a privilege
escalation vulnerability. The default user account may also execute
commands causing a phone to become unstable and result in a denial of
service. The default user account can not be disabled, removed or have
its password changed. There are mitigations available for these
vulnerabilities.

Cisco has made free software available to address these issues for
affected customers.

This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070221-phone.shtml

Affected Products
=================

This section provides details on affected products.

Vulnerable Products
+------------------

This section provides details on vulnerable products.

Cisco Unified IP Conference Station
+----------------------------------
+---------------------------------------+
| Model  |  Affected Firmware Version   |
|--------+------------------------------|
| 7935   | 3.2(15) and earlier          |
|--------+------------------------------|
| 7936   | 3.3(12) and earlier          |
+---------------------------------------+

Cisco Unified IP Phone
+---------------------
+---------------------------------------+
|  Model  |      Firmware Version       |
|---------+-----------------------------|
| 7906G   | 8.0(4)SR1 and earlier       |
|---------+-----------------------------|
| 7911G   | 8.0(4)SR1 and earlier       |
|---------+-----------------------------|
| 7941G   | 8.0(4)SR1 and earlier       |
|---------+-----------------------------|
| 7961G   | 8.0(4)SR1 and earlier       |
|---------+-----------------------------|
| 7970G   | 8.0(4)SR1 and earlier       |
|---------+-----------------------------|
| 7971G   | 8.0(4)SR1 and earlier       |
+---------------------------------------+

The version of firmware running on an IP phone can be determined via
the Settings menu on a phone.

In most deployments, Cisco Unified CallManager (CUCM) can also be
used to accurately determine the version of firmware that is supposed
to be running on an IP phone. While CUCM maintains a record of the
firmware it last deployed to an IP phone, it is possible for a user
to change the firmware version on an IP phone.

Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------

Cisco Unified IP Phone 7902G, 7905, 7905G, 7910, 7912, 7912G, 7920,
7921G, 7940, 7960 and 7985 devices are not vulnerable to the default
account and privilege escalation vulnerability.

No other Cisco products are known to be vulnerable.

Details
=======

Cisco Unified IP Conference Station Administrative Bypass
Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------------------------

Cisco Unified IP Conference Station 7935 and 7936 devices provide
integrated speaker phone services for a networked environment. 7935/
7936 devices can be managed via an administrative HTTP interface and/
or a with Cisco Unified CallManager (CUCM) system. The administrative
HTTP interface is protected by a user configurable password. If a
user knows the direct path to a management URL, it may be possible to
access the administrative HTTP interface without being prompted for
authentication. The vulnerability occurs because vulnerable IP
Conference Station devices incorrectly maintain the state of
administrator login sessions. If an administrator logs into a
vulnerable device via the HTTP interface, the administrator's
credentials will be cached even after the administrator logs out of
the device. This leaves a window of opportunity for an unauthorized
user to gain complete administrative access to a vulnerable device.
If an administrator never accesses a potentially vulnerable device
via the HTTP interface, the device is not vulnerable to the
authentication bypass attack. It is possible to reset to an IP
Conference Station to a non-vulnerable state by power-cycling the
device or performing a reboot operation (not a reload operation) via
the CUCM system which manages the device. This defect is documented
in Cisco Bug ID CSCsg26788 ( registered customers only) .

Cisco Unified IP Phone Default Account and Privilege Escalation
Vulnerabilities
+--------------------------------------------------------------

Cisco Unified IP Phone 7906G, 7911G, 7941G, 7961G, 7970G and 7971G
devices provide integrated phone service for a networked environment.
These IP phones devices contain a hard coded default user account
with a default password that is used for debugging purposes and is
embedded into the phone's firmware. This default user account cannot
be disabled, removed or have its password changed. Due to an
implementation error, it possible to use the hard coded default user
account to remotely access the Command Line Interface (CLI) of a
vulnerable IP phone via a phone's SSH server. The SSH server is only
supposed to authenticate user accounts which have been created by an
administrator. The SSH server may not be disabled. The firmware
update including the solution for this vulnerability prohibits the
default user account from accessing a phone via the SSH server, but
the default user account may still access the phone via the console
serial port. This defect is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsg34758 ( 
registered customers only) .

Using the default user account to access the CLI of a vulnerable IP
phone device (via SSH or the console serial port), an attacker can
execute a number of commands which may result in the escalation of
privileges leading to complete compromise of an affected IP phone or
cause an IP phone to become unstable and crash. These defects are
documented in Cisco Bug IDs CSCsg34789 ( registered customers only)
and CSCsg42627 ( registered customers only) .

Vulnerability Scoring Details
=============================

Cisco is providing scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).

Cisco will provide a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of
the vulnerability in individual networks.

Cisco PSIRT will set the bias in all cases to normal. Customers are
encouraged to apply the bias parameter when determining the
environmental impact of a particular vulnerability.

CVSS is a standards based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.

Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding
CVSS at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html

Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss


CSCsg26788 - IP Conference Station HTTP Interface Administrator Bypass
+---------------------------------------------------------------------

CVSS Base Score: 10
	Access Vector: Remote
	Access Complexity: Low
	Authentication: Not Required
	Confidentiality Impact: Complete
	Integrity Impact: Complete
	Availability Impact: Complete
	Impact Bias: Normal

CVSS Temporal Score: 8.3
	Exploitability: Functional
	Remediation Level: Official Fix
	Report Confidence: Confirmed
	
CSCsg34758 - IP Phone SSH Vulnerability
+--------------------------------------

CVSS Base Score: 10
	Access Vector: Remote
	Access Complexity: Low
	Authentication: Not Required
	Confidentiality Impact: Complete
	Integrity Impact: Complete
	Availability Impact: Complete
	Impact Bias: Normal

CVSS Temporal Score: 8.3
	Exploitability: Functional
	Remediation Level: Official Fix
	Report Confidence: Confirmed

CSCsg34789 - Filesystem Privilege Escalation
+-------------------------------------------

CVSS Base Score: 6
	Access Vector: Remote
	Access Complexity: Low
	Authentication: Required
	Confidentiality Impact: Complete
	Integrity Impact: Complete
	Availability Impact: Complete
	Impact Bias: Normal

CVSS Temporal Score: 5
	Exploitability: Functional
	Remediation Level: Official Fix
	Report Confidence: Confirmed

CSCsg42627 - Filesystem Denial of Service
+----------------------------------------

CVSS Base Score: 2
	Access Vector: Remote
	Access Complexity: Low
	Authentication: Required
	Confidentiality Impact: None
	Integrity Impact: None
	Availability Impact: Complete
	Impact Bias: Normal

CVSS Temporal Score: 1.7
	Exploitability: Functional
	Remediation Level: Official Fix
	Report Confidence: Confirmed


Impact
======

Successful exploitation of the Conference Station administrative
bypass or IP Phone default account and privilege escalation
vulnerabilities may result in the complete compromise of a vulnerable
device.

Software Version and Fixes
==========================

When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to
determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.

In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.

Cisco Unified IP Conference Station
+----------------------------------

+---------------------------------------+
| Model  |    Fixed Firmware Version    |
|--------+------------------------------|
| 7935   | 3.2(16)                      |
|--------+------------------------------|
| 7936   | 3.3(13)                      |
+---------------------------------------+

Cisco Unified IP Phone
+---------------------

+---------------------------------------+
| Model  |    Fixed Firmware Version    |
|--------+------------------------------|
| 7906G  | 8.0(4)SR2, 8.2(1)            |
|--------+------------------------------|
| 7911G  | 8.0(4)SR2, 8.2(1)            |
|--------+------------------------------|
| 7941G  | 8.0(4)SR2, 8.2(1)            |
|--------+------------------------------|
| 7961G  | 8.0(4)SR2, 8.2(1)            |
|--------+------------------------------|
| 7970G  | 8.0(4)SR2, 8.2(1)            |
|--------+------------------------------|
| 7971G  | 8.0(4)SR2, 8.2(1)            |
+---------------------------------------+

Fixed software can be obtained here:

http://www.cisco.com/cgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/ip-7900ser

Workarounds
===========

For Cisco Unified Conference Station and IP Phone devices, the
following mitigations have been provided.

The effectiveness of any mitigation or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied mitigation or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.

Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within
the network are available in the Cisco Applied Intelligence companion
document for this advisory:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-air-20070221-phone.shtml

Apply access control lists (ACLs) on routers, switches and firewalls
that filter traffic to vulnerable Conference Station and IP Phone
devices so that traffic is only allowed from stations that need to
remotely administer the devices.

It is possible to workaround the Cisco Unified IP Conference Station
Administrative Bypass vulnerability by ensuring that the
administrative HTTP interface is not used to manage any vulnerable
devices. If the HTTP interface must be used, vulnerable devices
should be power cycled or rebooted via a CUCM system after system
changes are made.

Obtaining Fixed Software
========================

Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed
software becomes available. Prior to deploying software, customers
should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for
feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their
environment.

Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by
the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise
set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center /sw-usingswc.shtml.

Do not contact either "psirt@...co.com" or "security-alert@...co.com"
for software upgrades.

Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------

Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.

Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------

Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through
prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations
such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance
with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.

The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.

Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------

Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third-party
vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through
their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.

  * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
  * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
  * e-mail: tac@...co.com

Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free
upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the
TAC.

Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including special localized
telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
various languages.

Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
 
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.

The Conference Station administrative bypass vulnerability was
reported to Cisco by Christian Reichert, Christian Blum and Jens Link
of Intact Integrated Services.

The IP Phone default account and privilege escalation vulnerabilities
were discovered internally by Cisco.

Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.

A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.

Distribution
============

This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at :

http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070221-phone.shtml

In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.

  * cust-security-announce@...co.com
  * first-teams@...st.org
  * bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
  * vulnwatch@...nwatch.org
  * cisco@...t.colorado.edu
  * cisco-nsp@...k.nether.net
  * full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
  * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@...sgate.cisco.com

Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.

Revision History
================

+---------------------------------------+
| Revision |                  | Initial |
| 1.0      | 2007-February-21 | public  |
|          |                  | release |
+---------------------------------------+

Cisco Security Procedures
=========================

Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco
security notices.  All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
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