Message-id: <200702211220.supplicant@psirt.cisco.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2007 12:20:26 -0500
From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team <psirt@...co.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Cc: psirt@...co.com
Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities
	in 802.1X Supplicant

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Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in 802.1X Supplicant

Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20070221-supplicant

http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070221-supplicant.shtml

Revision 1.0

For Public Release 2007 February 21 1600 UTC (GMT)

- -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary
=======

The Cisco Secure Services Client (CSSC) is a software client that
enables customers to deploy a single authentication framework using the
802.1X authentication standard across multiple device types to access
both wired and wireless networks. A lightweight version of the CSSC
client is also a component of the Cisco Trust Agent (CTA) within the
Cisco Network Admission Control (NAC) Framework solution.

These products are affected by multiple vulnerabilities including
privilege escalations and information disclosure.

Cisco has made free software available to address these vulnerabilities
for affected customers.

This advisory is posted at 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070221-supplicant.shtml.

Affected Products
=================

This section provides details on affected products.

Vulnerable Products
+------------------

Any version of the following software clients, prior to the versions
which are listed in the Software Versions and Fixes section below, may
be vulnerable.

  * Cisco Secure Services Client 4.x versions
  * Cisco Trust Agent 1.x and 2.x versions
  * Meetinghouse AEGIS SecureConnect Client (Windows platform versions)
  * Cisco Security Agent (CSA) bundle versions 5.0 and 5.1

To determine the version of the Cisco Trust Agent installed, the
"ctastat" command found in the

\Program Files\Cisco Systems\CiscoTrustAgent

directory will provide output similar to:

    Cisco Trust Agent Statistics
    Current Time: Tue Sep 27 19:11:18 2005
    CTA Version: 2.0.0.26


To determine the version of the Cisco Secure Services Client installed,
the software version information may be found in "About" dialog window
which may be launched underneath the Help tab within the client.

Cisco Security Agent bundle versions 5.0 and 5.1 included Cisco Trust
Agent software within the bundle. Customers who have deployed CTA as
part of their CSA client package may be vulnerable if the version of
CTA included is a version which is affected.

Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------

No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these
vulnerabilities.

Details
=======

The Cisco Secure Services Client (CSSC) is a software client that
enables customers to deploy a single authentication framework using the
802.1X authentication standard across multiple device types to access
both wired and wireless networks. Previously this product was marketed
as the Meetinghouse AEGIS SecureConnect client.

Cisco Trust Agent (CTA) installed on end-hosts is a core component of
the Cisco Network Admission Control (NAC) Framework solution. CTA
optionally includes a lightweight version of CSSC to provide
authentication as part of the NAC Framework solution, using the network
infrastructure to enforce security policy compliance on all devices
seeking to access network computing resources.

Both products are affected by multiple vulnerabilities including
privilege escalations and password disclosure.

Privilege Escalations
+--------------------

Four privilege escalation vulnerabilities exist in both products.

  * It is possible for an unprivileged user who is logged into the
    computer to increase their privileges to the local system user via
    the help facility within the supplicant Graphical User Interface
    (GUI). This vulnerability is documented by Cisco Bug ID CSCsf14120
  * An unprivileged user who is logged into the computer is able to
    launch any program on a system to run with SYSTEM privileges from
    within the supplicant application. This vulnerability is documented
    by Cisco Bug ID CSCsf15836 
  * Insecure default Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACL) for the
    connection client GUI (ConnectionClient.exe) allows an unprivileged
    user to inject a thread under ConnectionClient.exe running with
    SYSTEM level privileges. This vulnerability is documented by Cisco
    Bug ID CSCsg20558 
  * Due to the method used in parsing commands, it is possible that an
    unprivileged user who is logged into the computer could launch a
    process as the local system user. This vulnerability is documented
    by Cisco Bug IDs CSCsh30297 and CSCsh30624

Password Disclosure
+------------------

With authentication methods which convey a password in a protected
tunnel the users password will be logged in cleartext in the
application log files described below (assuming default installation
paths). This will occur with the following methods:

  * TTLS CHAP
  * TTLS MSCHAP
  * TTLS MSCHAPv2
  * TTLS PAP
  * MD5
  * GTC
  * LEAP
  * PEAP MSCHAPv2
  * PEAP GTC
  * FAST

CTA Wired Client:

  * \Program Files\Cisco Systems\Cisco Trust Agent 802_1x Wired Client\
    system\log\apiDebug_current.txt
  * \Program Files\Cisco Systems\Cisco Trust Agent 802_1x Wired Client\
    system\log\apiDebug_1.txt
  * \Program Files\Cisco Systems\Cisco Trust Agent 802_1x Wired Client\
    system\log\apiDebug_2.txt

Cisco Secure Services Client:

  * \Program Files\Cisco System\Cisco Secure Services Client\ system\
    log\apiDebug_current.txt
  * \Program Files\Cisco System\Cisco Secure Services Client\ system\
    log\apiDebug_1.txt
  * \Program Files\Cisco System\Cisco Secure Services Client\ system\
    log\apiDebug_2.txt

AEGIS Secure Connect:

  * \Program Files\Meetinghouse\AEGIS SecureConnect\System\log\
    apiDebug_current.txt
  * \Program Files\Meetinghouse\AEGIS SecureConnect\System\log\
    apiDebug_1.txt
  * \Program Files\Meetinghouse\AEGIS SecureConnect\System\log\
    apiDebug_2.txt

This log file is rotated on a regular basis and will be recreated if
the file has been deleted.

This vulnerability is documented by Cisco Bug ID CSCsg34423 

Vulnerability Scoring Details
+----------------------------

Cisco is providing scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).

Cisco will provide a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the
vulnerability in individual networks.

Cisco PSIRT will set the bias in all cases to normal. Customers are
encouraged to apply the bias parameter when determining the
environmental impact of a particular vulnerability.

CVSS is a standards based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.

Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS
at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html.

Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at 
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss.


CSCsf14120: Privilege escalation vulnerability via Help facility

CVSS Base Score: 5.6
    Access Vector: Local
    Access Complexity: High
    Authentication: Not Required
    Confidentiality Impact: Complete
    Integrity Impact: Complete
    Availability Impact: Complete
    Impact Bias: Normal

CVSS Temporal Score: 4.6
    Exploitability: Functional
    Remediation Level: Official Fix
    Report Confidence: Confirmed



CSCsf15836: Privilege escalation vulnerability via web browser

CVSS Base Score: 7
    Access Vector: Local
    Access Complexity: Low
    Authentication: Not Required
    Confidentiality Impact: Complete
    Integrity Impact: Complete
    Availability Impact: Complete
    Impact Bias: Normal

CVSS Temporal Score: 5.8
    Exploitability: Functional
    Remediation Level: Official Fix
    Report Confidence: Confirmed



CSCsg20558: ConnectionClient.exe vulnerable to Local Privilege Escalation

CVSS Base Score: 7
    Access Vector: Local
    Access Complexity: Low
    Authentication: Not Required
    Confidentiality Impact: Complete
    Integrity Impact: Complete
    Availability Impact: Complete
    Impact Bias: Normal

CVSS Temporal Score: 5.8
    Exploitability: Functional
    Remediation Level: Official Fix
    Report Confidence: Confirmed



CSCsh30297: Security vulnerability while launching a process
   and
CSCsh30624: Security vulnerability while launching a process

CVSS Base Score: 7
    Access Vector: Local
    Access Complexity: Low
    Authentication: Not Required
    Confidentiality Impact: Complete
    Integrity Impact: Complete
    Availability Impact: Complete
    Impact Bias: Normal

CVSS Temporal Score: 5.8
    Exploitability: Functional
    Remediation Level: Official Fix
    Report Confidence: Confirmed



CSCsg34423: User's password written to log file

CVSS Base Score: 1.6 
    Access Vector: Local
    Access Complexity: Low
    Authentication: Not Required
    Confidentiality Impact: Partial
    Integrity Impact: None
    Availability Impact: None
    Impact Bias: Normal

CVSS Temporal Score: 1.3
    Exploitability: Functional
    Remediation Level: Official Fix
    Report Confidence: Confirmed


Impact
======

Successful exploitation of any one of the four privilege escalation
vulnerabilities may result in a user gaining privilege to run programs,
read or modify files, or otherwise damage the integrity,
confidentiality, and availability of the system.

If any of the authentication methods described earlier is employed,
then a user who can access the apiDebug_current.txt file or previous
copies of this file created via normal log rotation may see passwords
of other users in cleartext, enabling them to impersonate and
authenticate as those users gaining the privilege and identity of the
compromised user account.

Software Version and Fixes
==========================

When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine
exposure and a complete upgrade solution.

In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.

The table below lists the first fixed releases for each specific
vulnerability. Customers wishing to get all of the fixes may simply
download CTA version 2.1.103.0 or CSSC version 4.0.51.5192.

+-------------------------------------------------------------+
|    Category    |      BugID       | Product |  First Fixed  |
|                |                  |         |   Releases    |
|----------------+------------------+---------+---------------|
|                |                  | CTA     | 2.1.18.0      |
|                | CSCsf14120       |---------+---------------|
|                |                  | CSSC    | 4.0.51.5192   |
|                |------------------+---------+---------------|
|                |                  | CTA     | 2.1.18.0      |
|                | CSCsf15836       |---------+---------------|
| Privilege      |                  | CSSC    | 4.0.51.5192   |
| Escalations    |------------------+---------+---------------|
|                |                  | CTA     | 2.1.103.0     |
|                | CSCsg20558       |---------+---------------|
|                |                  | CSSC    | 4.0.51.5192   |
|                |------------------+---------+---------------|
|                | CSCsh30297 and   | CTA     | 2.1.103.0     |
|                | CSCsh30624       |---------+---------------|
|                |                  | CSSC    | 4.0.51.5192   |
|----------------+------------------+---------+---------------|
| Password       |                  | CTA     | 2.1.103.0     |
| Disclosures    | CSCsg34423       |---------+---------------|
|                |                  | CSSC    | 4.0.51.5192   |
+-------------------------------------------------------------+

Workarounds
===========

There are no workarounds available for the privilege escalation
vulnerabilities.

The password disclosure vulnerability may be temporarily mitigated by
deleting the current apidebug_current.txt file and previous versions of
the file. This workaround is only temporary as those files will be
automatically recreated by the application.

Obtaining Fixed Software
========================

Cisco will make free software available to address these
vulnerabilities for affected customers. This advisory will be updated
as fixed software becomes available. Prior to deploying software,
customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the
software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to
their environment.

Customers may only install and expect support for the feature
sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing
or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to
be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found
at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.

Do not contact either "psirt@...co.com" or "security-alert@...co.com"
for software upgrades.

Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------

Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com.

Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------

Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as
Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the
appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.

The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.

Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------

Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors
but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of
sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical
Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.

  * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
  * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
  * e-mail: tac@...co.com

Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades
for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.

Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including special localized
telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
various languages.

Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================

The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.

Two of these vulnerabilities were reported to Cisco by a customer. The
others were found internally.

Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT
YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.

A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled
copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.

Distribution
============

This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at :

http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20070221-supplicant.shtml

In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.

  * cust-security-announce@...co.com
  * first-teams@...st.org
  * bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
  * vulnwatch@...nwatch.org
  * cisco@...t.colorado.edu
  * cisco-nsp@...k.nether.net
  * full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
  * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@...sgate.cisco.com

Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.

Revision History
================

+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Revision 1.0  | 2007-February-21  | Initial public release  |
+-------------------------------------------------------------+

Cisco Security Procedures
=========================

Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering
to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's
worldwide website at 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco
security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.

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All contents are Copyright 2006-2007 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights
reserved. 
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Updated: Feb 21, 2007                                Document ID: 81676

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