Date: Sat, 8 Dec 2007 17:32:37 -0500
From: "Fetch, Brandon" <bfetch@....com>
To: "Peter Besenbruch" <prb@...a.net>,
	<full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Compromise of Tor,
	anonymizing networks/utilities

However, the key point is to understand and maintain that anonymous does
not imply or beget security nor vice versa.

You can use Tor to make yourself "anonymous" to your destinations on the
Internet.  However, those requests are still submitted from the exit
node in their standard format (HTTP for general browsing or SMTP for
e-mail).

It's this lack of "last mile" security that some will suggest using an
encrypted proxy but that still may not resolve the issue of the
requested destination not supporting a secure connection.

Hiding behind/through Tor and an encrypted proxy just puts more layers
of obfuscation into the mix but still doesn't provide any more security.

Security through obscurity (anonymous) does not work and anonymous does
not equal secure.

Remember, there is no such thing as perfect security or anonymity.

-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk
[mailto:full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk] On Behalf Of Peter
Besenbruch
Sent: Saturday, December 08, 2007 12:39 PM
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Compromise of Tor,anonymizing
networks/utilities

On Saturday 08 December 2007 05:58:51 gmaggro wrote:
> So I guess CIA -> CSIS, FBI -> RCMP, and NSA -> CSE/GCHQ/DSD/GCSB. The
> last bit being the standard bunch of Echelon sons-of-bitches. Those
lads
> must have some fat pipes. Now are they hidden, or hidden in plain
sight?

Not that fat, as Tor is usually quite slow.

> In any case, it is a certainty than that some law enforcement agencies
> are running tor nodes; it has been spotted in actual use at many such
> locales. Tor might a great idea but it is sadly lacking in many
aspects
> of its implementation. Let us consider it a good first step, but now
> it's time to move on.

It would help if you were more specific here. Especially, could you
flesh out 
what you mean by, "it is sadly lacking in many aspects of its 
implementation."

> >From now on we should all operate under the assumption that every
> anonymizing network is rife with law enforcement infiltration.

The most useful node to compromise is the exit node, as that is the one 
frequently handling the DNS process, as well as the node actually making

requests from the Web site in question. The exit node also knows which
node 
just upstream it's talking to, but not any further upstream. In
addition, it 
knows nothing about the original requester. I understand it's sometimes 
possible to backtrack painstakingly based on timings, but it would be
easier 
if law enforcement had control of all nodes. As it is, law enforcement
would 
have to deal with multiple nodes, spread over multiple, not always
friendly 
jurisdictions.

> In fact, future designs should incorporate this infiltration into
their
> development; there has got to be a way to use this against them.

Which is what TOR has done.

> Tactically, do folks think it would be better to withdraw from Tor use
> slowly whilst replacing the resulting traffic with filler to keep up
> appearances? Or ditch it wholesale in the hopes that larger and abrupt
> changes in usage will disrupt or confuse our friends with badges?

I think a better question would be: How does TOR compare with your bog 
standard anonymizing proxy server? To go further, how does TOR compare
with a 
scheme like JAP combined with another anonymizing proxy.

I'll toss this out as something to think about: Perfect anonymity is
like 
perfect security; with enough work both can be broken. The point is to
make 
it hard to do.

-- 
Hawaiian Astronomical Society: http://www.hawastsoc.org
HAS Deepsky Atlas: http://www.hawastsoc.org/deepsky

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