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Message-Id: <20081231175752.40EB1118041@smtp.hushmail.com>
Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2008 12:57:52 -0500
From: "Elazar Broad" <elazar@...hmail.com>
To: valdis.kletnieks@...edu
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Creating a rogue CA certificate
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That's true, keeping up with security is not cheap nor easy.
Tradeoff's are tradeoff's, the question is, when it comes down to
the $$$, is more cost effective to be proactive vs reactive in this
case. Time will tell...
On Tue, 30 Dec 2008 16:42:47 -0500 Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu wrote:
>On Tue, 30 Dec 2008 16:13:07 EST, Elazar Broad said:
>> And they should have listened then, it was only a matter of time
>> before someone fleshed out a practical attack, and that time is
>> now. Then again, I am sure there some ATM's out there still
>using
>> DES. How many time's do we need to prove Moore's law...
>
>Playing devil's advocate for a moment...
>
>And perhaps they *were* listening, but realized that security is
>about
>tradeoffs, and they balanced the cost of doing the upgrade back
>then
>against the chances that a team as technically and budget-wise
>prepared
>as this one, *and with nefarious intent*, would do something
>significantly
>drastic enough to dent their revenue stream.
>
>Read section 5.2 of the hashclash/rogue-ca paper. The victim CA
>is churning
>out an average of 1,000 certs in 3 days, let's say at $12 per.
>That's some
>$600K per year for just the weekends, not counting the Mon-Thurs
>span which
>is probably even higher (and why they targeted a weekend). So $2M
>per year
>or more.
>
>Who wants to place a bet that said CA will be selling *the same
>number*
>of certs every week, meaning they had *no* economic loss due to
>this hack,
>because their customers won't actually *see* the news article and
>give them
>a bad feeling about their CA? And with no actual loss, why spend
>the money
>to implement the change?
>
>Hint: It *isn't* just a matter of changing one line in a script to
>say
>'sha1' instead of 'md5' - you *also* need to go back and look at
>all the
>certs you've issued already and figure out if they've been
>tweaked...
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