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Message-Id: <20081231180845.E4E8D118040@smtp.hushmail.com>
Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2008 13:08:45 -0500
From: "Elazar Broad" <elazar@...hmail.com>
To: valdis.kletnieks@...edu
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Creating a rogue CA certificate
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<snip>
is more cost effective
</snip>
should have been is *it
On Wed, 31 Dec 2008 12:57:52 -0500 Elazar Broad
<elazar@...hmail.com> wrote:
>That's true, keeping up with security is not cheap nor easy.
>Tradeoff's are tradeoff's, the question is, when it comes down to
>the $$$, is more cost effective to be proactive vs reactive in
>this
>case. Time will tell...
>
>On Tue, 30 Dec 2008 16:42:47 -0500 Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu wrote:
>>On Tue, 30 Dec 2008 16:13:07 EST, Elazar Broad said:
>>> And they should have listened then, it was only a matter of
>time
>>> before someone fleshed out a practical attack, and that time is
>>> now. Then again, I am sure there some ATM's out there still
>>using
>>> DES. How many time's do we need to prove Moore's law...
>>
>>Playing devil's advocate for a moment...
>>
>>And perhaps they *were* listening, but realized that security is
>>about
>>tradeoffs, and they balanced the cost of doing the upgrade back
>>then
>>against the chances that a team as technically and budget-wise
>>prepared
>>as this one, *and with nefarious intent*, would do something
>>significantly
>>drastic enough to dent their revenue stream.
>>
>>Read section 5.2 of the hashclash/rogue-ca paper. The victim CA
>>is churning
>>out an average of 1,000 certs in 3 days, let's say at $12 per.
>>That's some
>>$600K per year for just the weekends, not counting the Mon-Thurs
>>span which
>>is probably even higher (and why they targeted a weekend). So
>$2M
>>per year
>>or more.
>>
>>Who wants to place a bet that said CA will be selling *the same
>>number*
>>of certs every week, meaning they had *no* economic loss due to
>>this hack,
>>because their customers won't actually *see* the news article and
>>give them
>>a bad feeling about their CA? And with no actual loss, why spend
>>the money
>>to implement the change?
>>
>>Hint: It *isn't* just a matter of changing one line in a script
>to
>>say
>>'sha1' instead of 'md5' - you *also* need to go back and look at
>>all the
>>certs you've issued already and figure out if they've been
>>tweaked...
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