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Message-ID: <2a66a350901051311q3f587953tf9fb95a95fdc62df@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Jan 2009 13:11:53 -0800
From: chort <chort0@...il.com>
To: Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: FD / lists.grok.org - bad SSL cert

On Mon, Jan 5, 2009 at 11:46 AM,  <Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu> wrote:
> On Mon, 05 Jan 2009 11:25:58 PST, Tim said:
>> Uh, no, actually CAs provide some weak assurance that the certificate is
>> the real one and associated with that server.  A self-signed one
>> provides none.  If you can't, in some way, authenticate the certificate
>> then SSL is not any better than sending data plain text.
>
> It's *slightly* better, in that it guards against passive sniffing attacks
> on the data in transit. You're right that it doesn't guard against an
> active MITM attack.

The prevailing use of self-signed certs on the Internet basically
destroys the usefulness of HTTPS, since it trains users to simply
click "add exception" and ignore the scary warnings "because then I
get the lock icon, which means I'm safe!"

The browser security model should be changed to visually differentiate
between "encrypted" and "authenticated", but that would require
massive re-engineering of browser software, and lengthy re-education
of lusers.

Given the option between no HTTPS and HTTPS via self-signed cert, you
should choose the former if you're running a public website.  If the
connections really do need to be protected, stop being so effing
stingy and cough up the $70 for a certificate signed by a CA that is
in the default trusted bundle of major browsers.

-- 
chort

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