Message-ID: <cd51a8c60901230509p1cc0b60cs3660b3cffe597c58@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 15:09:10 +0200
From: Avraham Schneider <avri.schneider@...il.com>
To: ghost <ghosts@...il.com>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: The war in Palestine

The Palestinian Pandora's Box

Yoram Ettinger, Ynet, January 23, 2009





The mild reaction by Arab countries to the Hamas-driven Palestinian
predicament in Gaza refutes the assumption that the Palestinian issue is a
top Arab priority and that it constitutes the core cause of Arab hostility
toward the West, USA and Israel.  In fact, the Arab reaction has reflected
overall Arab attitude toward the Palestinian issue since 1948, through the
1982 Israel-PLO war in Lebanon and the First and Second Intifadah,
irrespective of the identity of the Palestinian leadership: Haj Amin
al-Husseini, Shukeiri, Hammuda <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yahya_Hammuda>,
Arafat, Abu Mazen or Haniyeh.



Arab countries have always showered Palestinians with rhetoric, but they
have refrained from significant support.  During the 2009 Gaza War, Arab
countries rejected the call for an emergency session of Arab leaders on
behalf of Gaza.  They have limited their meek support to a gathering of Arab
foreign ministers, calling for a UN emergency session.  Saudi Arabia
dismissed the suggestion to employ oil as a weapon.  Riad prohibits
pro-Palestinian rallies and its religious establishment issued a weak
proclamation on behalf of the Palestinian struggle.  The Gulf Cooperation
Council focused on economic and monetary issues during its December 30, 2008
meeting, according lips service to Gaza.



A similar reaction occurred during the 1982 Israel-PLO war in Lebanon, which
erupted on June 4.  The Arab oil producing countries convened in August to
discuss the price of oil, dismissing the proposal to use the oil weapon on
behalf of the PLO.  The summit of Arab leaders was deliberately delayed
until September, following the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut.



Arab leaders have systematically demonstrated how secondary the Palestinian
issue has been in their order of national priorities.  For instance, Arab
financial support of the PLO was less than 10% of Arab financial support to
the anti-Soviet Muslims in Afghanistan.  In 1988, the Arab League convened
on behalf of the First Intifadah, committing itself to $128MN immediate
support, followed by $43MN monthly assistance.  Less than $100MN was
actually transferred to the PLO, compared with over $1BN annual support to
Afghanistan during 1978-1988.  In 2002, Saudi Arabia pledged $600MN for the
Second Intifadah, but only $100MN has been transferred so far.  Other Arab
countries made a $55MN monthly commitment, but – as expected – they have
once again failed to deliver.



Recent precedents have led Arabs to consider the Palestinians a potential
treacherous, subversive, explosive Pandora's box, which could undermine
their survival.  On the other hand, Palestinians blame Arab leaders for the
"1948 Debacle."  In 1948/9, the Arab League made it clear that the war
against the Jewish State was not launched because – or for – the
Palestinians.  It declared the provisional Palestinian government null and
void, while Egypt and Jordan expelled the Palestinian leadership from Gaza,
Judea and Samaria. During the late 1950s, and in 1966, Arafat, Abu Mazen and
their Fatah colleagues were evicted from Egypt and Syria for subversion.  In
1970, they were decimated in Jordan, following an attempt to topple the
Hashemite regime ("Black September").  In 1975/76, they were clobbered by
Syria (in Lebanon), as a result of their assault on the central government
in Beirut ("Black June").  In 1983, they lost their base in Tripoli,
Lebanon, after they failed to challenge the dominant local militia. In 1987,
Egypt killed scores of Palestinians, who demonstrated on behalf of the First
Intifadah in the Rafah refugee camp in Sinai/Gaza. In 1991, Kuwait expelled
300,000 Palestinians for collaboration with Saddam's plunder of the
sheikhdom. Since 2003, thousands of Palestinians have fled Iraq, due to
their identification with the Butcher of Baghdad. The Red Carpet, which
welcomes Palestinian leaders at the UN and in Western capitals, is
transformed into a shabby rug upon landing in Arab capitals.



What do Arab leaders know - about the Palestinians - which has escaped
Western and Israeli policy-makers?

Arab leaders have not dedicated themselves to advance the Palestinian
cause.  They have not regarded the Palestinian issue as a premier link in
the formulation of their policies.  Domestic, regional and global factors
have impacted inter-Arab, Arab-Western and Arab-Israel relations much more
than the Palestinian issue.  Palestinians do not possess veto power over
Arab policy-making.



Since the 1993 Oslo Accord, Israel has subordinated its national security
policy to the resolution of the Palestinian issue, switching its focus from
the Israeli-Arab path to the Israeli-Palestinian path.  Dozens of
initiatives, conferences, summits, agreements and cease fires have yielded a
series of short-lived illusions of peace and security, which were promptly
crashed by an unprecedented Palestinian wave of hate-education, violation of
commitments and terrorism. In fact, the roadmap toward the resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict does not go through Ramallah or Gaza, but rather
through Cairo, Amman and other Arab capitals, as evidenced by Israel's peace
treaties with Egypt and Jordan, which have withstood Palestinian opposition
and an on-going Israeli war against Palestinian terrorism.



A policy which is based on an erroneous assumption – that the Palestinian
issue is supposedly the crown jewel of Arab policy – constitutes an
erroneous policy. It exacerbates regional instability, fuels terrorism,
promotes war and diminishes the prospects for peace.



Israel should base its policy, toward the Palestinians, on the track record
of the last 100 years, and especially the last 15 years, which have featured
the failure of Land-for-Peace on the Palestinian track.

Lessons of recent history, Israel's minimal security requirements and the
need to minimize motivation for Arab terrorism, highlight the necessity to
solidify Israel's control of Judea and Samaria.




On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 8:10 AM, ghost <ghosts@...il.com> wrote:

> Most prefer Bayer :-)
>
> On Thu, Jan 22, 2009 at 6:13 PM, Avraham Schneider
> <avri.schneider@...il.com> wrote:
> > Advil?
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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