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Message-ID: <1266965946.2441.8117.camel@new-desktop>
Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2010 23:59:06 +0100
From: Nicob <nicob@...ob.net>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Kojoney (SSH honeypot) remote DoS
[=] Affected software :
Name : Kojoney
Description : Low interaction SSH honeypot
Version : < 0.0.4.2
Service : TCP/22
[=] Patched version :
http://sourceforge.net/projects/kojoney/files/kojoney-0.0.4.2.tar.gz/download
[=] Technical details :
Emulation of the wget and curl commands is made via calls to
urllib.urlopen(url). The only sanity check is the following :
if url.find("://") == -1:
url = "http://" + url
This will catch some attempts to access local files like
"file:/etc/hosts" but requesting "file://localhost/foo/bar" is still
possible.
Under Linux, this can be used to access "file://localhost/dev/urandom".
The kojoney.py process will then use 100% of CPU and will grow in
memory, until killed by the kernel OOM Killer.
[=] Note :
When exploiting urlopen() related vulnerabilities in Python
applications, some little known features can come handy :
data://,HelloWorld
=> returned value is "HelloWorld"
data:text;base64,WDVPIVAlQEFQWzRcUFpYNTQoUF4pN0NDKTd9JEVJQ0FSLVNUQU5EQVJELUFOVElWSVJVUy1URVNULUZJTEUhJEgrSCo=://a
=> returned value is the EICAR test string
And yes, these strings too bypass the "://" Kojoney check ;-)
Nicob
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