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Message-ID: <426E9C71C99E6DB13E125C0D@utd71538.local>
Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2010 14:50:06 -0600
From: Paul Schmehl <pschmehl_lists@...rr.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Allegations regarding OpenBSD IPSEC

There are several problems with this story that seem to have been 
overlooked.

First, if someone was able to alter the crypto source code 10 years ago, 
you have to assume that in the following 10 years not one person reviewing 
or editing that code would have noticed a thing.  So, the person who did 
the altering has to be smarter than every other crypto guy who worked on 
the code.  Smart enough that nobody would even notice what he did and smart 
enough that nothing would be noticed operationally.  Not one entity, with 
all the security personnel those entities employed, would have ever noticed 
or even inadvertently stumbled across any traffic going to an unexpected 
place.

Second, no one editing the crypto code after the alteration would have ever 
made a single change to the code that would affect the alteration in an 
adverse way, either rendering it inoperable or causing it to generate 
traffic that would be unexpected and noticed by watchful eyes.

Now we're talking a genius on the level of Einstein, at least.  Of all the 
code in use, crypto is probably the most scrutinized and is scrutinized by 
the smartest guys.  All of whom were apparently too dumb to notice 
*anything* unusual in the code at all, if this story is to be believed. 
And he was able to alter it in a way that made it completely resistant to 
any future changes in the code.

Finally, the guy who sent Theo the email obviously lied, or else there's a 
third Scott Lowe that hasn't yet been unearthed.

It's impossible to prove a negative.  So, if you want to hurt or get back 
at Theo for some reason, the easiest way to do it is claim there's a 
supersekrit backdoor in the code that no one has noticed for ten years. 
Now Theo gets to go on a wild goose chase that has no resolution, because 
you cannot prove there is no backdoor.  The best you can do is claim to 
have thoroughly audited the code and not found one.

Conspiracy theorists thrive on claims that can never be disproven.  A 
hundred years from now, people will still be whispering that there's a 
backdoor in the crypto supplied by OpenBSD.  Just like they claim that 
Oswald didn't act alone and the government blew up the twin towers.  Common 
sense and the preponderance of the evidence tell you otherwise, but all 
that is ignored in favor of the grand theory that big brother is watching.

Rational people don't fall for this stuff.

Should the code be audited?  Of course!  Auditing is always useful and 
often productive.  Should we assume the worst?  Not without better evidence 
than what we have before us now.

-- 
Paul Schmehl, Senior Infosec Analyst
As if it wasn't already obvious, my opinions
are my own and not those of my employer.
*******************************************
"It is as useless to argue with those who have
renounced the use of reason as to administer
medication to the dead." Thomas Jefferson
"There are some ideas so wrong that only a very
intelligent person could believe in them." George Orwell

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