full-disclosure - Re: Trustwave and Mozilla

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Message-ID: <4F390799.7030903@own-hero.net>
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2012 13:52:41 +0100
From: decoder <decoder@...-hero.net>
To: noloader@...il.com
Cc: FunSec List <funsec@...uxbox.org>,
	Full Disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Trustwave and Mozilla

Hi Jeffrey,

On 02/12/2012 11:54 AM, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
> For what its worth, pinning the certificate can usually remediate
> these sorts of MitM attacks, but Mozilla subverted it:
> http://ssl.entrust.net/blog/?p=615.

Please take a look at our security roadmap (
https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Roadmap ). You will see that CA
pinning is a P1 Feature which means it is actively being worked on. In
fact our update service does already some sort of pinning (for securely
retrieving updates), it's just that failures are not reported right now.
It's possible that this sort of pinning could be extended to other
services and also alert the user (and/or us, if that is possible somehow).

Cheers,

Chris

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