lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <04F9AFDCA6560B42B91DB1A429B7D0DE05534458@G1W3778.americas.hpqcorp.net>
Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2012 13:59:17 +0000
From: ZDI Disclosures <zdi-disclosures@...pingpoint.com>
To: "'full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk'" <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>, 
	"'bugtraq@...urityfocus.com'" <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Cc: ZDI Disclosures <zdi-disclosures@...com>
Subject: ZDI-12-177 : (0Day) HP SiteScope SOAP Call
 loadFileContent Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

ZDI-12-177 : (0Day) HP SiteScope SOAP Call loadFileContent Remote Code
Execution Vulnerability
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-177
August 29, 2012

- -- CVE ID:


- -- CVSS:
10, AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

- -- Affected Vendors:
Hewlett-Packard

- -- Affected Products:
Hewlett-Packard SiteScope

- -- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection:
TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this
vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 12493.
For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS, visit:

    http://www.tippingpoint.com

- -- Vulnerability Details:
This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on
vulnerable installations of HP SiteScope. Authentication is not required to
exploit this vulnerability. 

The specific flaw exists because HP SiteScope allows unauthenticated SOAP
calls to be made to the SiteScope service. One of those calls is
loadFileContent() which will return the content of any local file on the
server including the configuration files containing password information.
This can lead to remote code execution under the context of the current
process.

- -- Vendor Response:


- -- Mitigation:
Given the stated purpose of SiteScope, and the nature of the vulnerability,
the only salient mitigation strategy is to restrict interaction with the
service to trusted machines. Only the clients and servers that have a
legitimate procedural relationship with the HP SiteScope service should be
permitted to communicate with it. This could be accomplished in a number of
ways, most notably with firewall rules/whitelisting. These features are
available in the native Windows Firewall, as described in
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc725770%28WS.10%29.aspx and
numerous other Microsoft Knowledge Base articles.


- -- Disclosure Timeline:
2011-12-22 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2012-08-29 - 0Day advisory released in accordance with the ZDI 180 day
deadline policy

- -- Credit:
This vulnerability was discovered by:
* Andrea Micalizzi aka rgod

- -- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI):
Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents 
a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly
disclosing discovered vulnerabilities.

Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research
through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at:

    http://www.zerodayinitiative.com

The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is
used. TippingPoint does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any
exploit code. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor,
TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through
its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the
specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until
an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the
altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint
provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security
vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or
mitigation product.

Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at:

    http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/

Follow the ZDI on Twitter:

    http://twitter.com/thezdi

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP Desktop 10.2.0 (Build 1950)
Charset: utf-8

wsBVAwUBUD4gLlVtgMGTo1scAQIY/QgAhFnlLyiw9kIX5+dpjHgBKnvaOPLGK3yE
5Vw171zkNyTBaUrSCklyfXvQryZc2xB5KWYwfB5jLh4yR+iqQzG2OWEtYqKJIUdN
Ljzf017LKMyIRWa0dO8MQX/1NeQ/xW2KIVTWN3lyLkGwQWJ9IpP6Df3nfhfkfspA
STk/3ocu2KXfFRfQIufOYWeT2i3YxVD3TkPKQovmcvbmT2TzkvwLGWSKStgUFyjK
RPninKH0jZariieqK++8VSrZLXdk9ZtYBsvTQWmy6DFinkipmHE+li8oZbACInXO
0LLmVoDw9pdU4SxjpY8mMVvuk98bnKCQW+IVig2POotX/y8AggvMNg==
=2l1A
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ