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Message-ID: <04F9AFDCA6560B42B91DB1A429B7D0DE05534469@G1W3778.americas.hpqcorp.net> Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2012 14:00:44 +0000 From: ZDI Disclosures <zdi-disclosures@...pingpoint.com> To: "'full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk'" <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>, "'bugtraq@...urityfocus.com'" <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com> Cc: ZDI Disclosures <zdi-disclosures@...com> Subject: ZDI-12-178 : (0Day) HP SiteScope SOAP Call update Remote Code Execution Vulnerability -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ZDI-12-178 : (0Day) HP SiteScope SOAP Call update Remote Code Execution Vulnerability http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-178 August 29, 2012 - -- CVE ID: - -- CVSS: 10, AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C - -- Affected Vendors: Hewlett-Packard - -- Affected Products: Hewlett-Packard SiteScope - -- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection: TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 12502. For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS, visit: http://www.tippingpoint.com - -- Vulnerability Details: This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of HP SiteScope. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists because HP SiteScope allows unauthenticated SOAP calls to be made to the SiteScope service. One of those calls is update() which allows an unauthenticated user to update the admin credentials. This can lead to remote code execution under the context of the current process. - -- Vendor Response: - -- Mitigation: Given the stated purpose of SiteScope, and the nature of the vulnerability, the only salient mitigation strategy is to restrict interaction with the service to trusted machines. Only the clients and servers that have a legitimate procedural relationship with the HP SiteScope service should be permitted to communicate with it. This could be accomplished in a number of ways, most notably with firewall rules/whitelisting. These features are available in the native Windows Firewall, as described in http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc725770%28WS.10%29.aspx and numerous other Microsoft Knowledge Base articles. - -- Disclosure Timeline: 2011-12-22 - Vulnerability reported to vendor 2012-08-29 - 0Day advisory released in accordance with the ZDI 180 day deadline policy - -- Credit: This vulnerability was discovered by: * Andrea Micalizzi aka rgod - -- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI): Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly disclosing discovered vulnerabilities. Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is used. TippingPoint does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any exploit code. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor, TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or mitigation product. Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at: http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/ Follow the ZDI on Twitter: http://twitter.com/thezdi -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP Desktop 10.2.0 (Build 1950) Charset: utf-8 wsBVAwUBUD4giFVtgMGTo1scAQLRPgf+JxL5j+aklwaI3qK+giwPSzjDhddFXpuW QqrjC/Vj2k4VVzp6eNZ1kMUOOZM3dDUrGCHTF1PXF2tQYe/ZtRuc2pFaE+4CnFmz 4oGCIvUv/bd3iyFpfFLED0tnqp1Y3nRbAsv6UKW8z3QeyZig5zqACLwPRfSxgQ02 KCoEZG7tzAlXApHSRKWXSjrhDTHDtn1DqzPc4hKHl14NjN4kOCch5LxUv9eH4X2T 4fo1ZpvGw1piYcWdLDx2i4GVmHJ42kntlRZlBh6X9x4H4htXF0Hq+X4DOsr9Xmrs NCOJFj3DQei41IFv1+c39w3igCItMDMdIYKM2CcrYj0VpPeb0HFyfw== =WQOQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
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