Message-ID: <CAH4bqJOW0=zqu1oEGzDzDZ4uW+F02BrrwBz5KvSSQQizpON39Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 17:23:46 +0530
From: aditya <nauty.me04@...il.com>
To: Christian Sciberras <uuf6429@...il.com>
Cc: full-disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: The email that hacks you

I totally agree with Christian, it is as insane as passing username and
passwords using GET requests. But congrats Bogdan for the bringing to us a
nice hack.

Have u shared the code as well Bogdan?

On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:07 PM, Christian Sciberras <uuf6429@...il.com>wrote:

> From an architectural perspective, "auto logins" or whatever they're
> called should work through a random string, just as most providers already
> do.
> There is absolutely no reason to pass the username/password from a
> URL, especially when in plain text as in these cases.
> Since there is no loss of features (there are safer, saner, sensible
> alternatives), I think this is better considered a bug, since it is never
> actually needed in the first place.
>
> Also, with the random token system, I think it is best to still require
> the user/pass when the URL the user is directed to is going to do something
> such as modifying/updating stuff.
>
>
> Chris.
>
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 12:15 PM, Bogdan Calin <bogdan@...netix.com>wrote:
>
>> Yes, I agree with you.
>>
>> However, my opinion it that it should be fixed once and for all in
>> iOS/Webkit (and the other
>> browsers) by disabling resources loaded with credentials.
>>
>> At some point, as a protection for phishing, URLs with the format
>> scheme://username:password@...tname/ were disabled.
>> When you enter in the browser bar something like that it doesn't work in
>> most browsers.
>>
>> I was surprised to see that doing something like <image
>> src='scheme://username:password@...tname/path'> works in Chrome and
>> Firefox but if you enter the
>> same URL in the browser bar it doesn't work. This doesn't work in
>> Internet Explorer, which is the
>> right behavior in my opinion.
>>
>> I don't see any good reason why something like this should work. Closing
>> this in browsers will solve
>> this problem once and for all.
>>
>> On 11/28/2012 1:00 PM, Guifre wrote:
>> > Hello,
>> >
>> > "I can also confirm that this attack works on iPhone, iPad and Mac's
>> > default mail client."
>> >
>> > Of course, it works anywhere where arbitrary client-side code can be
>> > executed... IMAHO, the issue here is not your iphone loading images,
>> > there are millions of attack vectors to trigger this attack... The
>> > problem is the CSRF weaknesses of your router admin panel that should
>> > be fixed by synchronizing a secret token or by using any other well
>> > known mitigation strategy against these attacks.
>> >
>> > Best Regards,
>> > Guifre.
>> >
>>
>> --
>> Bogdan Calin - bogdan [at] acunetix.com
>> CTO
>> Acunetix Ltd. - http://www.acunetix.com
>> Acunetix Web Security Blog - http://www.acunetix.com/blog
>> Follow us on Twitter - http://www.twitter.com/acunetix
>>
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>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
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-- 
Regards
Aditya Balapure

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