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Message-ID: <50B60463.3070709@acunetix.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 14:32:35 +0200
From: Bogdan Calin <bogdan@...netix.com>
To: aditya <nauty.me04@...il.com>
Cc: full-disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: The email that hacks you
Thanks aditya,
The code is not published on the blog post but it's visible in the video.
It's very simple to reproduce this problem.
On 11/28/2012 1:53 PM, aditya wrote:
> I totally agree with Christian, it is as insane as passing username and passwords using GET
> requests. But congrats Bogdan for the bringing to us a nice hack.
>
> Have u shared the code as well Bogdan?
>
> On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:07 PM, Christian Sciberras <uuf6429@...il.com <mailto:uuf6429@...il.com>>
> wrote:
>
> From an architectural perspective, "auto logins" or whatever they're called should work through
> a random string, just as most providers already do.
> There is absolutely no reason to pass the username/password from a URL, especially when in plain
> text as in these cases.
> Since there is no loss of features (there are safer, saner, sensible alternatives), I think this
> is better considered a bug, since it is never actually needed in the first place.
>
> Also, with the random token system, I think it is best to still require the user/pass when the
> URL the user is directed to is going to do something such as modifying/updating stuff.
>
>
> Chris.
>
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 12:15 PM, Bogdan Calin <bogdan@...netix.com
> <mailto:bogdan@...netix.com>> wrote:
>
> Yes, I agree with you.
>
> However, my opinion it that it should be fixed once and for all in iOS/Webkit (and the other
> browsers) by disabling resources loaded with credentials.
>
> At some point, as a protection for phishing, URLs with the format
> scheme://username:password@...tname/ were disabled.
> When you enter in the browser bar something like that it doesn't work in most browsers.
>
> I was surprised to see that doing something like <image
> src='scheme://username:password@...tname/path'> works in Chrome and Firefox but if you enter the
> same URL in the browser bar it doesn't work. This doesn't work in Internet Explorer, which
> is the
> right behavior in my opinion.
>
> I don't see any good reason why something like this should work. Closing this in browsers
> will solve
> this problem once and for all.
>
> On 11/28/2012 1:00 PM, Guifre wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > "I can also confirm that this attack works on iPhone, iPad and Mac's
> > default mail client."
> >
> > Of course, it works anywhere where arbitrary client-side code can be
> > executed... IMAHO, the issue here is not your iphone loading images,
> > there are millions of attack vectors to trigger this attack... The
> > problem is the CSRF weaknesses of your router admin panel that should
> > be fixed by synchronizing a secret token or by using any other well
> > known mitigation strategy against these attacks.
> >
> > Best Regards,
> > Guifre.
> >
>
> --
> Bogdan Calin - bogdan [at] acunetix.com <http://acunetix.com>
> CTO
> Acunetix Ltd. - http://www.acunetix.com
> Acunetix Web Security Blog - http://www.acunetix.com/blog
> Follow us on Twitter - http://www.twitter.com/acunetix
>
> _______________________________________________
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> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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>
>
>
>
> --
> Regards
> Aditya Balapure
>
>
--
Bogdan Calin - bogdan [at] acunetix.com
CTO
Acunetix Ltd. - http://www.acunetix.com
Acunetix Web Security Blog - http://www.acunetix.com/blog
Follow us on Twitter - http://www.twitter.com/acunetix
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