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Message-ID: <CAH4bqJNXo6jWUfypxH=O2gmw5Bkte1H4MQDQUU96wAUzNXo42Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2012 18:14:06 +0530
From: aditya <nauty.me04@...il.com>
To: Bogdan Calin <bogdan@...netix.com>
Cc: full-disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: The email that hacks you

Please if you could share the code, I would like to test it for my router
as well.

Thanks

On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 6:02 PM, Bogdan Calin <bogdan@...netix.com> wrote:

> Thanks aditya,
>
> The code is not published on the blog post but it's visible in the video.
> It's very simple to reproduce this problem.
>
> On 11/28/2012 1:53 PM, aditya wrote:
> > I totally agree with Christian, it is as insane as passing username and
> passwords using GET
> > requests. But congrats Bogdan for the bringing to us a nice hack.
> >
> > Have u shared the code as well Bogdan?
> >
> > On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:07 PM, Christian Sciberras <uuf6429@...il.com<mailto:
> uuf6429@...il.com>>
> > wrote:
> >
> >     From an architectural perspective, "auto logins" or whatever they're
> called should work through
> >     a random string, just as most providers already do.
> >     There is absolutely no reason to pass the username/password from a
> URL, especially when in plain
> >     text as in these cases.
> >     Since there is no loss of features (there are safer, saner, sensible
> alternatives), I think this
> >     is better considered a bug, since it is never actually needed in the
> first place.
> >
> >     Also, with the random token system, I think it is best to still
> require the user/pass when the
> >     URL the user is directed to is going to do something such as
> modifying/updating stuff.
> >
> >
> >     Chris.
> >
> >
> >
> >     On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 12:15 PM, Bogdan Calin <bogdan@...netix.com
> >     <mailto:bogdan@...netix.com>> wrote:
> >
> >         Yes, I agree with you.
> >
> >         However, my opinion it that it should be fixed once and for all
> in iOS/Webkit (and the other
> >         browsers) by disabling resources loaded with credentials.
> >
> >         At some point, as a protection for phishing, URLs with the format
> >         scheme://username:password@...tname/ were disabled.
> >         When you enter in the browser bar something like that it doesn't
> work in most browsers.
> >
> >         I was surprised to see that doing something like <image
> >         src='scheme://username:password@...tname/path'> works in Chrome
> and Firefox but if you enter the
> >         same URL in the browser bar it doesn't work. This doesn't work
> in Internet Explorer, which
> >         is the
> >         right behavior in my opinion.
> >
> >         I don't see any good reason why something like this should work.
> Closing this in browsers
> >         will solve
> >         this problem once and for all.
> >
> >         On 11/28/2012 1:00 PM, Guifre wrote:
> >         > Hello,
> >         >
> >         > "I can also confirm that this attack works on iPhone, iPad and
> Mac's
> >         > default mail client."
> >         >
> >         > Of course, it works anywhere where arbitrary client-side code
> can be
> >         > executed... IMAHO, the issue here is not your iphone loading
> images,
> >         > there are millions of attack vectors to trigger this attack...
> The
> >         > problem is the CSRF weaknesses of your router admin panel that
> should
> >         > be fixed by synchronizing a secret token or by using any other
> well
> >         > known mitigation strategy against these attacks.
> >         >
> >         > Best Regards,
> >         > Guifre.
> >         >
> >
> >         --
> >         Bogdan Calin - bogdan [at] acunetix.com <http://acunetix.com>
> >         CTO
> >         Acunetix Ltd. - http://www.acunetix.com
> >         Acunetix Web Security Blog - http://www.acunetix.com/blog
> >         Follow us on Twitter - http://www.twitter.com/acunetix
> >
> >         _______________________________________________
> >         Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
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> >
> >
> >
> >     _______________________________________________
> >     Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> >     Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> >     Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Regards
> > Aditya Balapure
> >
> >
>
> --
> Bogdan Calin - bogdan [at] acunetix.com
> CTO
> Acunetix Ltd. - http://www.acunetix.com
> Acunetix Web Security Blog - http://www.acunetix.com/blog
> Follow us on Twitter - http://www.twitter.com/acunetix
>



-- 
Regards
Aditya Balapure

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