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Message-ID: <20130913064307.GA2778@sivokote.iziade.m$>
Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2013 09:43:07 +0300
From: Georgi Guninski <guninski@...inski.com>
To: king cope <isowarez.isowarez.isowarez@...glemail.com>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: OpenSSL,
OpenSSH ecdsa authentication code inconsistent return values.. no
vulnerability?
Didn't quite understood the checks, but here is an idea:
If you can make a user supplied point NOT ON THE curve
to be accepted as valid, this might break the other private
key (basically it is working on another curve, leaking info
about the private key).
There is a document describing the exact attack,
if you can do this check for a start:
http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/3820/why-do-public-keys-need-to-be-validated
On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 08:11:47AM +0200, king cope wrote:
> Hello lists,
>
> Attached is the blog post for the mentioned issues that in its shape
> are not a vulnerability, still interesting to see.
>
> http://kingcope.wordpress.com/2013/09/13/opensslopenssh-ecdsa-authentication-code-inconsistent-return-values-no-vulnerability/
>
> Cheers,
>
> Kingcope
>
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