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Message-ID: <CA+CewVCbZ03-X3ADLzYp2PkL0gAzHnNMDaprcVQ0npAm5B+p-Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2014 17:58:27 +0000
From: "Nicholas Lemonias." <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
To: antisnatchor <antisnatchor@...il.com>, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Fwd:  Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC

Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Nicholas Lemonias. <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
To: antisnatchor <antisnatchor@...il.com>


Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE 100.




On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor <antisnatchor@...il.com>wrote:

> LOL you're hopeless.
> Good luck with your business. Brave customers!
>
> Cheers
> antisnatchor
>
> Nicholas Lemonias. wrote:
>
>
> People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things
> like reading a vulnerability report?
>
> Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was
> your boss I would fire you.
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Nicholas Lemonias. <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
> Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM
> Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC
> To: Mario Vilas <mvilas@...il.com>
>
>
> People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things
> like reading a vulnerability report?
>
> Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I was
> your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas <mvilas@...il.com> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. <
>> lem.nikolas@...glemail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting  separation
>>> of duties in this security instance.
>>>
>>> Happy to see more professionals with some skills.  Some others have also
>>> mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code
>>> execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario.
>>>
>>
>> Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you
>> insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you
>> then...
>>
>>
>>>
>>> If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a
>>> bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants.
>>>
>>
>> You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer
>> tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Nicholas.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. <
>>> lem.nikolas@...glemail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those
>>>> points.
>>>> I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a
>>>> valid vulnerability..
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Best Regards,
>>>> Nicholas Lemonias.
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas <mvilas@...il.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from
>>>>> the Institute for
>>>>> Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. <
>>>>> lem.nikolas@...glemail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks Michal,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to the
>>>>>> research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout
>>>>>> some time.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including
>>>>>> Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We
>>>>>> are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>> Nicholas Lemonias.
>>>>>> AISec
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. <
>>>>>> lem.nikolas@...glemail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Jerome,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any
>>>>>>> file of choice.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits
>>>>>>> multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels
>>>>>>> that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on
>>>>>>> that job.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias <
>>>>>>> athiasjerome@...il.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding.
>>>>>>>> Reporting this finding makes sense in this context.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding is
>>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>>> Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or
>>>>>>>> Requirements[1])
>>>>>>>> * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability. Vulnerability +
>>>>>>>> Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability that needs Business
>>>>>>>> Impact and Risk Analysis
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So I would probably have reported this Finding as a Weakness (and
>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>> Vulnerability. See: OWASP, WASC-TC, CWE), explaining that it is not
>>>>>>>> Best Practice (your OWASP link and Cheat Sheets), and even if
>>>>>>>> mitigative/compensative security controls (Ref Orange Book),
>>>>>>>> security
>>>>>>>> controls like white listing (or at least black listing. see also
>>>>>>>> ESAPI) should be 1) part of the [1]security requirements of a proper
>>>>>>>> SDLC (Build security in) as per Defense-in-Depth security principles
>>>>>>>> and 2) used and implemented correctly.
>>>>>>>> NB: A simple Threat Model (i.e. list of CAPEC) would be a solid
>>>>>>>> support to your report
>>>>>>>> This would help to evaluate/measure the risk (e.g. CVSS).
>>>>>>>> Helping the decision/actions around this risk
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> PS: interestingly, in this case, I'm not sure that the Separation of
>>>>>>>> Duties security principle was applied correctly by Google in term of
>>>>>>>> Risk Acceptance (which could be another Finding)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So in few words, be careful with the terminology. (don't always say
>>>>>>>> vulnerability like the media say hacker, see RFC1392) Use a CWE ID
>>>>>>>> (e.g. CWE-434, CWE-183, CWE-184 vs. CWE-616)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> My 2 bitcents
>>>>>>>> Sorry if it is not edible :)
>>>>>>>> Happy Hacking!
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> /JA
>>>>>>>> https://github.com/athiasjerome/XORCISM
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 2014-03-14 7:19 GMT+03:00 Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@...edump.cx>:
>>>>>>>> > Nicholas,
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > I remember my early years in the infosec community - and sadly,
>>>>>>>> so do
>>>>>>>> > some of the more seasoned readers of this list :-) Back then, I
>>>>>>>> > thought that the only thing that mattered is the ability to find
>>>>>>>> bugs.
>>>>>>>> > But after some 18 years in the industry, I now know that there's
>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>> > even more important and elusive skill.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > That skill boils down to having a robust mental model of what
>>>>>>>> > constitutes a security flaw - and being able to explain your
>>>>>>>> thinking
>>>>>>>> > to others in a precise and internally consistent manner that
>>>>>>>> convinces
>>>>>>>> > others to act. We need this because the security of a system
>>>>>>>> can't be
>>>>>>>> > usefully described using abstract terms: even the academic
>>>>>>>> definitions
>>>>>>>> > ultimately boil down to saying "the system is secure if it
>>>>>>>> doesn't do
>>>>>>>> > the things we *really* don't want it to do".
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > In this spirit, the term "vulnerability" is generally reserved for
>>>>>>>> > behaviors that meet all of the following criteria:
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > 1) The behavior must have negative consequences for at least one
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> > the legitimate stakeholders (users, service owners, etc),
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > 2) The consequences must be widely seen as unexpected and
>>>>>>>> unacceptable,
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > 3) There must be a realistic chance of such a negative outcome,
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > 4) The behavior must introduce substantial new risks that go
>>>>>>>> beyond
>>>>>>>> > the previously accepted trade-offs.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > If we don't have that, we usually don't have a case, no matter how
>>>>>>>> > clever the bug is.
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > Cheers (and happy hunting!),
>>>>>>>> > /mz
>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>> > _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>>>>>>>> > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>>>>>>>> > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>>>>>> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>>>>>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> "There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights
>>>>> the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When
>>>>> the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the
>>>>> people."
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>>>>> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>>>>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> "There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights
>> the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When
>> the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the
>> people."
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>
>
> --
> Cheers
> Michele
>
>

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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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