Message-ID: <CA+CewVCkm8dwJgTeBjANrLOVEYuMqqQd_hnrCyoD8paWXUnoww@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2014 18:00:29 +0000
From: "Nicholas Lemonias." <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
To: antisnatchor <antisnatchor@...il.com>, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC

The full-disclosure mailing list has really changed. It's full of lamers
nowdays aiming high.





On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. <
lem.nikolas@...glemail.com> wrote:

> Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE
> 100.
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Nicholas Lemonias. <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
> Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM
> Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
> To: antisnatchor <antisnatchor@...il.com>
>
>
> Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My customers are FTSE
> 100.
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor <antisnatchor@...il.com>wrote:
>
>> LOL you're hopeless.
>> Good luck with your business. Brave customers!
>>
>> Cheers
>> antisnatchor
>>
>> Nicholas Lemonias. wrote:
>>
>>
>> People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things
>> like reading a vulnerability report?
>>
>> Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I
>> was your boss I would fire you.
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: Nicholas Lemonias. <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
>> Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM
>> Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC
>> To: Mario Vilas <mvilas@...il.com>
>>
>>
>> People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do basic things
>> like reading a vulnerability report?
>>
>> Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary files. If I
>> was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the door.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas <mvilas@...il.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. <
>>> lem.nikolas@...glemail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting  separation
>>>> of duties in this security instance.
>>>>
>>>> Happy to see more professionals with some skills.  Some others have
>>>> also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote code
>>>> execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if you
>>> insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good luck to you
>>> then...
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a
>>>> bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants.
>>>>
>>>
>>> You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no longer
>>> tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank.
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Nicholas.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. <
>>>> lem.nikolas@...glemail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree on those
>>>>> points.
>>>>> I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that is a
>>>>> valid vulnerability..
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Best Regards,
>>>>> Nicholas Lemonias.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas <mvilas@...il.com>wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try this one from
>>>>>> the Institute for
>>>>>> Certified Application Security Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. <
>>>>>> lem.nikolas@...glemail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thanks Michal,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We are just trying to improve Google's security and contribute to
>>>>>>> the research community after all. If you are still on EFNet give me a shout
>>>>>>> some time.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients including
>>>>>>> Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's biggest corporations. We
>>>>>>> are also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>> Nicholas Lemonias.
>>>>>>> AISec
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias. <
>>>>>>> lem.nikolas@...glemail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hi Jerome,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thank you for agreeing on access control, and separation of duties.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> However successful exploitation permits arbitrary write() of any
>>>>>>>> file of choice.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python that permits
>>>>>>>> multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the Google security team feels
>>>>>>>> that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so we are not so keen on
>>>>>>>> that job.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias <
>>>>>>>> athiasjerome@...il.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hi
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I concur that we are mainly discussing a terminology problem.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this is a Finding.
>>>>>>>>> Reporting this finding makes sense in this context.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> As a professional, you would have to explain if/how this finding
>>>>>>>>> is a
>>>>>>>>> Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance, Policies or
>>>>>>>>> Requirements[1])
>>>>>>>>> * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability. Vulnerability +
>>>>>>>>> Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability that needs Business
>>>>>>>>> Impact and Risk Analysis
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So I would probably have reported this Finding as a Weakness (and
>>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>>> Vulnerability. See: OWASP, WASC-TC, CWE), explaining that it is not
>>>>>>>>> Best Practice (your OWASP link and Cheat Sheets), and even if
>>>>>>>>> mitigative/compensative security controls (Ref Orange Book),
>>>>>>>>> security
>>>>>>>>> controls like white listing (or at least black listing. see also
>>>>>>>>> ESAPI) should be 1) part of the [1]security requirements of a
>>>>>>>>> proper
>>>>>>>>> SDLC (Build security in) as per Defense-in-Depth security
>>>>>>>>> principles
>>>>>>>>> and 2) used and implemented correctly.
>>>>>>>>> NB: A simple Threat Model (i.e. list of CAPEC) would be a solid
>>>>>>>>> support to your report
>>>>>>>>> This would help to evaluate/measure the risk (e.g. CVSS).
>>>>>>>>> Helping the decision/actions around this risk
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> PS: interestingly, in this case, I'm not sure that the Separation
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> Duties security principle was applied correctly by Google in term
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> Risk Acceptance (which could be another Finding)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So in few words, be careful with the terminology. (don't always say
>>>>>>>>> vulnerability like the media say hacker, see RFC1392) Use a CWE ID
>>>>>>>>> (e.g. CWE-434, CWE-183, CWE-184 vs. CWE-616)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> My 2 bitcents
>>>>>>>>> Sorry if it is not edible :)
>>>>>>>>> Happy Hacking!
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> /JA
>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/athiasjerome/XORCISM
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 2014-03-14 7:19 GMT+03:00 Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@...edump.cx>:
>>>>>>>>> > Nicholas,
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > I remember my early years in the infosec community - and sadly,
>>>>>>>>> so do
>>>>>>>>> > some of the more seasoned readers of this list :-) Back then, I
>>>>>>>>> > thought that the only thing that mattered is the ability to find
>>>>>>>>> bugs.
>>>>>>>>> > But after some 18 years in the industry, I now know that there's
>>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>>> > even more important and elusive skill.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > That skill boils down to having a robust mental model of what
>>>>>>>>> > constitutes a security flaw - and being able to explain your
>>>>>>>>> thinking
>>>>>>>>> > to others in a precise and internally consistent manner that
>>>>>>>>> convinces
>>>>>>>>> > others to act. We need this because the security of a system
>>>>>>>>> can't be
>>>>>>>>> > usefully described using abstract terms: even the academic
>>>>>>>>> definitions
>>>>>>>>> > ultimately boil down to saying "the system is secure if it
>>>>>>>>> doesn't do
>>>>>>>>> > the things we *really* don't want it to do".
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > In this spirit, the term "vulnerability" is generally reserved
>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>> > behaviors that meet all of the following criteria:
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > 1) The behavior must have negative consequences for at least one
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> > the legitimate stakeholders (users, service owners, etc),
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > 2) The consequences must be widely seen as unexpected and
>>>>>>>>> unacceptable,
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > 3) There must be a realistic chance of such a negative outcome,
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > 4) The behavior must introduce substantial new risks that go
>>>>>>>>> beyond
>>>>>>>>> > the previously accepted trade-offs.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > If we don't have that, we usually don't have a case, no matter
>>>>>>>>> how
>>>>>>>>> > clever the bug is.
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > Cheers (and happy hunting!),
>>>>>>>>> > /mz
>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>> > _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>>>>>>>>> > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>>>>>>>>> > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>>>>>>> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>>>>>>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> "There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights
>>>>>> the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When
>>>>>> the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the
>>>>>> people."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>>>>>> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>>>>>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> "There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights
>>> the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When
>>> the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the
>>> people."
>>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>>
>>
>> --
>> Cheers
>> Michele
>>
>>
>
>

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Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
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