[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <C32DFEE29DA2461FA6A9940E4ECBC1C5@W340>
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2016 23:31:42 +0100
From: "Stefan Kanthak" <stefan.kanthak@...go.de>
To: <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Cc: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: [FD] Executable installers are vulnerable^WEVIL (case 32): Comodo's
installers allow arbitrary (remote) code execution WITH
escalation of privilege
Hi @ll,
the executable installers cispro_30day_installer_1150_8d.exe,
cispremium_installer_6100_08.exe, cav_installer_5951_60.exe,
cav_installer.exe and cfw_installer.exe available from
<http://www.comodo.com> load and execute several DLLs from
their "application directory".
For software downloaded with a web browser the application
directory is typically the user's "Downloads" directory: see
<https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2008/09/carpet-bombing-and-directory-poisoning.html>,
<http://blog.acrossecurity.com/2012/02/downloads-folder-binary-planting.html>
and <http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2012/Aug/134>
If an attacker places one of these DLLs in the users "Downloads"
directory (for example per drive-by download or social engineering)
this vulnerability becomes a remote code execution.
Due to the application manifest embedded in the executables which
specifies "requireAdministrator" the executable installer is run
with administrative privileges ("protected" administrators are
prompted for consent, unprivileged standard users are prompted for
an administrator password); execution of the DLLs therefore results
in an escalation of privilege!
Proof of concept/demonstration:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1. visit <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/sentinel.html>, download
<http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/download/SENTINEL.DLL> and save
it as UXTheme.dll in your "Downloads" directory, then copy it
as DWMAPI.dll, RichEd20.dll, ClbCatQ.dll and ProfAPI.dll;
2. download any of the executable installers provided by Comodo
and save them in your "Downloads" directory;
3. run the executable installers from the "Downloads" directory;
4. notice the message boxes displayed from the DLLs placed in
step 1.
PWNED!
See <http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Nov/101> and
<http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/86> as well as
<http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/!execute.html> and
<http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/sentinel.html> for details about
this well-known and well-documented BEGINNER'S error!
stay tuned
Stefan Kanthak
PS: I really LOVE (security) software with such trivial beginner's
errors. It's a tell-tale sign to better stay away from it!
Timeline:
~~~~~~~~~
2016-01-21 sent report to vendor
NO ANSWER, not even an acknowledgement of receipt
2016-01-28 resent report to vendor
2016-01-28 Vendor acknowledges receipt
2016-02-29 Vendor informs:
"update ready, schedule for release during the week of
March 14"
2016-03-22 Vendor releases updates; see the release notes
<https://cdn.download.comodo.com/cis/download/installs/updates/release/inis_4055/release_notes.html>
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists