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Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2016 01:58:43 -0700
From: David Leo <david.leo@...psonly.net>
To: "fulldisclosure@...lists.org" <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] HTTPS Only 3.1 (Detailed Analysis, Browser Security,
 Open Source, Python)

To secure browser which is very fragile, the approach of HTTPS Only 3.1 is exceptionally simple:
1. Only HTTPS URLs(no other protocols)
2. Whitelist of domains(anything outside of whitelist is blocked)

Now, let's look at threats:
1. Man in the middle - it's fixed.
2. Phishing always requires the browser to load attacker's website, so it's permanently dead here.
3. Drive-by Download - dead(if applied strictly, unable to download the executable)
4. Clickjacking - dead(attacker's web page is unreachable)
5. Address Spoofing - dead too(just unable to load the fake content)
6. XSS - almost dead(for attacker, the XSS vulnerability has to be GET, because POST requires attacker's HTML)
7. CSRF - almost dead(for attacker, the CSRF vulnerability has to be GET, and modern web applications simply don't do important things in GET, because it can be bookmarked etc, too dangerous)

URLs:
Project Home Page: https://www.httpsonly.net/
View Source Code: https://www.httpsonly.net/source/

Kind Regards,


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