Message-ID: <CAPk8CmpXg2eHpa3BjqAD1=ANHS39UpxSSHj1pUV0TVikJ3giNw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2020 20:47:15 +0100
From: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@...il.com>
To: bugtraq <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>, fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] TP-LINK Cloud Cameras NCXXX Remote NULL Pointer Dereference

Vulnerability title: TP-LINK Cloud Cameras NCXXX Remote NULL Pointer Dereference
Author: Pietro Oliva
CVE: CVE-2020-10231
Vendor: TP-LINK
Product: NC200, NC210, NC220, NC230, NC250, NC260, NC450
Affected version: NC200 <= 2.1.8 build 171109, NC210 <= 1.0.9 build 171214,
                  NC220 <= 1.3.0 build 180105, NC230 <= 1.3.0 build 171205,
                  NC250 <= 1.3.0 build 171205, NC260 <= 1.5.1 build 190805,
                  NC450 <= 1.5.0 build 181022

Description:
The issue is located in the httpLoginRpm method of the ipcamera binary (handler
method for /login.fcgi), where after successful login, there is no check for
NULL in the return value of httpGetEnv(environment, "HTTP_USER_AGENT"). Shortly
after that, there is a call to strstr(user_agent_string, "Firefox") and if a
User-Agent header is not specified by the client, httpGetEnv will return NULL,
and a NULL pointer dereference occurs when calling strstr, with consequent crash
of the ipcamera process.

Impact:
After the crash, the web interface on port 80 will not be available anymore.

Exploitation:
An attacker could exploit this issue by just sending a login request with valid
credentials (such as admin or limited user), but without an user-agent HTTP
header. Default credentials can be used to bypass the credentials requirement.

Evidence:
The disassembly of affected code from an NC200 camera is shown below:

0x0047dca0   lw a0, (user_arg)
0x0047dca4   lw a1, (password_arg)
0x0047dca8   lw t9, -sym.swUMMatchPassword(gp)
0x0047dcac   nop
0x0047dcb0   jalr t9
0x0047dcb4   nop
0x0047dcb8   lw gp, (saved_gp)
0x0047dcbc   sw v0, (auth_result)
0x0047dcc0   lw v0, (auth_result)
0x0047dcc4   nop
0x0047dcc8   bnez v0, 0x47de34
0x0047dccc   nop
0x0047dcd0   sw zero, (arg_54h)
0x0047dcd4   lw a0, (environment)
0x0047dcd8   lw a1, -0x7fe4(gp)
0x0047dcdc   nop
0x0047dce0   addiu a1, a1, -0x7cb0       ; "HTTP_USER_AGENT"
0x0047dce4   lw t9, -sym.httpGetEnv(gp)
0x0047dce8   nop
0x0047dcec   jalr t9
0x0047dcf0   nop
0x0047dcf4   lw gp, (saved_gp)
0x0047dcf8   sw v0, (user_agent_ptr)
0x0047dcfc   lw a0, (user_agent_ptr)     ; <== This pointer could be NULL
0x0047dd00   lw a1, -0x7fe4(gp)
0x0047dd04   nop
0x0047dd08   addiu a1, a1, -0x7ca0       ; "Firefox"
0x0047dd0c   lw t9, -sym.imp.strstr(gp)
0x0047dd10   nop
0x0047dd14   jalr t9


Disclosure timeline:

2nd December 2019 - Initial vulnerability report for NC200.

4th December 2019 - Vendor confirms vulnerablity but does not start fixing
                    due to the product being end-of-life.

4th December 2019 - Notified vendor the vulnerability details will be public
                    and it should be fixed.

6th December 2019 - Thanks for your opinion, we will discuss and write back
                    to you.

<silence>

7th February 2020 - Notified vendor issue exists on NC450 and possibly all
                    models in between. Fixed a disclosure deadline in 30 days.

8th February 2020 - Vendor: We will check but please be patient.

18th February 2020 - We failed to reproduce the issue with the provided PoC.

<trying to troubleshoot>

24th February 2020 - Reverse engineered all the firmware images on behalf of
                     the vendor and notified they were all vulnerable.

2nd March 2020 - Vendor asks to check fixes for NC200.

2nd March 2020 - Confirmed fix. Asked the vendor to do the same on all cameras.

3rd March 2020 - Vendor will check on other cameras, but will take some time.

3rd March 2020 - Asked the vendor to be quick.

9th March 2020 - Notified CVE identifier to vendor, gave extra week to patch.

9th March 2020 - Vendor is testing fix on all models.

13th March 2020 - Vendor asks to confirm fixes.

13th March 2020 - Confirmed fixes and asked the vendor to publish updates.
                  Disclosure delayed one week to give some time to patch if
                  the vendor published firmware updates.

29th March 2020 - No updates have been made public by the vendor. Releasing
                  details to the public after almost 4 months from initial
                  notification.

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