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Message-ID: <85A9A687-D5E0-4EE4-8FFE-ED70C8CCE863@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 23 May 2025 10:14:04 -0700
From: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, David Laight <david.laight.linux@...il.com>
CC: Ethan Carter Edwards <ethan@...ancedwards.com>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] ext4: replace strcpy() with '.' assignment
On May 23, 2025 7:24:49 AM PDT, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu> wrote:
>On Fri, May 23, 2025 at 01:31:00PM +0100, David Laight wrote:
>>
>> The compiler (or headers files) can also allow strcpy() of constant
>> length strings into arrays (known size). Erroring requests that are too long.
>> The strcpy() is then converted to a memcpy() which can then be optimised
>> into writes of constants.
>>
>> So using strcpy() under those conditions 'isn't all bad' and can generate
>> better (and less bug prone) code than trying to hand-optimise it.
>>
>> So even through strcpy() is usually a bad idea, there is not need to
>> remove the calls that the compiler can validate as safe.
>
>I assume that what the hardening folks want to do is to assert that
>strcpy is always evil(tm) so they can detect potential security bugs
>by doing "git grep strcpy".
FWIW, what I'd like is a lack of ambiguity for both humans and compilers. "Get rid of strcpy" is the Big Hammer solution for strcpy. The more precise version is "disallow strcpy of a src or dst where either lack a compile-time buffer size".
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
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