linux-hardening - Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall

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Message-ID: <202104011447.2E7F543@keescook>
Date:   Thu, 1 Apr 2021 15:42:08 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>
Cc:     'Will Deacon' <will@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
        Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" 
        <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        "linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org" <linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" 
        <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
        "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset
 each syscall

On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 11:15:43AM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> From: Will Deacon
> > Sent: 01 April 2021 09:31
> ...
> > > +/*
> > > + * These macros must be used during syscall entry when interrupts and
> > > + * preempt are disabled, and after user registers have been stored to
> > > + * the stack.
> > > + */
> > > +#define add_random_kstack_offset() do {					\
> > > +	if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT,	\
> > > +				&randomize_kstack_offset)) {		\
> > > +		u32 offset = __this_cpu_read(kstack_offset);		\
> > > +		u8 *ptr = __builtin_alloca(KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(offset));	\
> > > +		asm volatile("" : "=m"(*ptr) :: "memory");		\
> > 
> > Using the "m" constraint here is dangerous if you don't actually evaluate it
> > inside the asm. For example, if the compiler decides to generate an
> > addressing mode relative to the stack but with writeback (autodecrement), then
> > the stack pointer will be off by 8 bytes. Can you use "o" instead?

I see other examples of empty asm, but it's true, none are using "=m" read
constraints. But, yes, using "o" appears to work happily.

> Is it allowed to use such a mode?
> It would have to know that the "m" was substituted exactly once.
> I think there are quite a few examples with 'strange' uses of memory
> asm arguments.
> 
> However, in this case, isn't it enough to ensure the address is 'saved'?
> So:
> 	asm volatile("" : "=r"(ptr) );
> should be enough.

It isn't, it seems.

Here's a comparison:

https://godbolt.org/z/xYGn9GfGY

So, I'll resend with "o", and with raw_cpu_*().

Thanks!

-- 
Kees Cook