linux-hardening - Re: [PATCH v8 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall

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Date:   Thu, 1 Apr 2021 14:46:23 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Roy Yang <royyang@...gle.com>
Cc:     akpm@...ux-foundation.org, alex.popov@...ux.com,
        ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org, catalin.marinas@....com, corbet@....net,
        david@...hat.com, elena.reshetova@...el.com, glider@...gle.com,
        jannh@...gle.com, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
        linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, luto@...nel.org, mark.rutland@....com,
        peterz@...radead.org, rdunlap@...radead.org, rppt@...ux.ibm.com,
        tglx@...utronix.de, vbabka@...e.cz, will@...nel.org, x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each
 syscall

On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 12:17:44PM -0700, Roy Yang wrote:
> Both Android and Chrome OS really want this feature; For Container-Optimized OS, we have customers
> interested in the defense too.

It's pretty close! There are a couple recent comments that need to be
addressed, but hopefully it can land if x86 and arm64 maintainers are
happy v10.

> Change-Id: I1eb1b726007aa8f9c374b934cc1c690fb4924aa3
> -- 
> 2.31.0.208.g409f899ff0-goog

And to let other folks know, I'm guessing this email got sent with git
send-email to try to get a valid In-Reply-To header, but I guess git
trashed the Subject and ran hooks to generate a Change-Id UUID.

I assume it's from following the "Reply instructions" at the bottom of:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210330205750.428816-1-keescook@chromium.org/
(It seems those need clarification about Subject handling.)

-- 
Kees Cook