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Message-ID: <202406171053.F72BF013@keescook>
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2024 10:59:59 -0700
From: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
To: Anjali K <anjalik@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: mpe@...erman.id.au, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, npiggin@...il.com,
naveen@...nel.org, christophe.leroy@...roup.eu,
gustavoars@...nel.org, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org,
vishalc@...ux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] powerpc/pseries: Whitelist dtl slub object for copying
to userspace
On Fri, Jun 14, 2024 at 11:08:44PM +0530, Anjali K wrote:
> Reading the dispatch trace log from /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/dtl/cpu-*
> results in a BUG() when the config CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled as
> shown below.
>
> kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
> Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
> LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
> Modules linked in: xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time sd_mod t10_pi sg ibmvfc
> scsi_transport_fc ibmveth pseries_wdt dm_multipath dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
> CPU: 27 PID: 1815 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3 #85
> Hardware name: IBM,9040-MRX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NM1060_042) hv:phyp pSeries
> NIP: c0000000005d23d4 LR: c0000000005d23d0 CTR: 00000000006ee6f8
> REGS: c000000120c078c0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.10.0-rc3)
> MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 2828220f XER: 0000000e
> CFAR: c0000000001fdc80 IRQMASK: 0
> [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
> NIP [c0000000005d23d4] usercopy_abort+0x78/0xb0
> LR [c0000000005d23d0] usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0
> Call Trace:
> usercopy_abort+0x74/0xb0 (unreliable)
> __check_heap_object+0xf8/0x120
> check_heap_object+0x218/0x240
> __check_object_size+0x84/0x1a4
> dtl_file_read+0x17c/0x2c4
> full_proxy_read+0x8c/0x110
> vfs_read+0xdc/0x3a0
> ksys_read+0x84/0x144
> system_call_exception+0x124/0x330
> system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
> --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff81f3ab34
>
> Commit 6d07d1cd300f ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
> requires that only whitelisted areas in slab/slub objects can be copied to
> userspace when usercopy hardening is enabled using CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
> Dtl contains hypervisor dispatch events which are expected to be read by
> privileged users. Hence mark this safe for user access.
> Specify useroffset=0 and usersize=DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES to whitelist the
> entire object.
>
> Co-developed-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@...ux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Vishal Chourasia <vishalc@...ux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Anjali K <anjalik@...ux.ibm.com>
> ---
> arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c
> index 284a6fa04b0c..cba40d9d1284 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c
> @@ -343,8 +343,8 @@ static int alloc_dispatch_log_kmem_cache(void)
> {
> void (*ctor)(void *) = get_dtl_cache_ctor();
>
> - dtl_cache = kmem_cache_create("dtl", DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES,
> - DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES, 0, ctor);
> + dtl_cache = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("dtl", DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES,
> + DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES, 0, 0, DISPATCH_LOG_BYTES, ctor);
> if (!dtl_cache) {
> pr_warn("Failed to create dispatch trace log buffer cache\n");
> pr_warn("Stolen time statistics will be unreliable\n");
Are you sure you want to universally expose this memory region? It
sounds like it's only exposed via a debug interface. Maybe it'd be
better to use a bounce buffer in the debug interface instead?
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/dtl.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/dtl.c
index 3f1cdccebc9c..3adcff5cc4b2 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/dtl.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/dtl.c
@@ -257,6 +257,22 @@ static int dtl_file_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
return 0;
}
+static inline int bounce_copy(char __user *buf, void *src, size_t size)
+{
+ u8 *bounce;
+ int rc;
+
+ bounce = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bounce)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memcpy(bounce, src, size);
+ rc = copy_to_user(buf, bounce, size);
+
+ kfree(bounce);
+ return rc;
+}
+
static ssize_t dtl_file_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t len,
loff_t *pos)
{
@@ -300,7 +316,7 @@ static ssize_t dtl_file_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t len,
if (i + n_req > dtl->buf_entries) {
read_size = dtl->buf_entries - i;
- rc = copy_to_user(buf, &dtl->buf[i],
+ rc = bounce_copy(buf, &dtl->buf[i],
read_size * sizeof(struct dtl_entry));
if (rc)
return -EFAULT;
@@ -312,7 +328,7 @@ static ssize_t dtl_file_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t len,
}
/* .. and now the head */
- rc = copy_to_user(buf, &dtl->buf[i], n_req * sizeof(struct dtl_entry));
+ rc = bounce_copy(buf, &dtl->buf[i], n_req * sizeof(struct dtl_entry));
if (rc)
return -EFAULT;
--
Kees Cook
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