linux-hardening - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/1] seal system mappings

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Message-ID: <CABi2SkVbETo3ZYS+M9u8EO-5+r+tsPnXE+0CKz8o3eck_HVtDg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2024 10:25:45 -0800
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
To: "Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>, 
	akpm@...ux-foundation.org, keescook@...omium.org, jannh@...gle.com, 
	torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, adhemerval.zanella@...aro.org, oleg@...hat.com, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-mm@...ck.org, jorgelo@...omium.org, sroettger@...gle.com, 
	ojeda@...nel.org, adobriyan@...il.com, anna-maria@...utronix.de, 
	mark.rutland@....com, linus.walleij@...aro.org, Jason@...c4.com, 
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	dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, mingo@...nel.org, ardb@...nel.org, 
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	enh@...gle.com, rientjes@...gle.com, groeck@...omium.org, 
	lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 0/1] seal system mappings

Hi Liam

On Wed, Oct 16, 2024 at 7:03 PM Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com> wrote:
>
> * Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org> [241016 20:59]:
> > On Wed, Oct 16, 2024 at 4:18 PM Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > * jeffxu@...omium.org <jeffxu@...omium.org> [241014 17:50]:
> > > > From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@...omium.org>
> > > >
> > > > Seal vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall.
> > > >
> > > > Those mappings are readonly or executable only, sealing can protect
> > > > them from ever changing during the life time of the process. For
> > > > complete descriptions of memory sealing, please see mseal.rst [1].
> > > >
I will mention unmap  in the above sentence.

> > > > System mappings such as vdso, vvar, and sigpage (for arm) are
> > > > generated by the kernel during program initialization. These mappings
> > > > are designated as non-writable, and sealing them will prevent them
> > > > from ever becoming writeable.
> > >                               ^ or ever removed.
> > >
This section is about the mappings (vdso, etc)  created during program
initialization vs later time as uprobe, I will revise  to make it
clearer to the reader.

Thanks
-Jeff