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Message-ID: <c526a04b0607261641n7f09242h86025282153e4c91@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2006 00:41:56 +0100
From: "Adam Henley" <adamazing@...il.com>
To: "Sébastien Bernard" <seb@...nkengul.org>
Cc: debian-sparc@...ts.debian.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Weird kernel 2.6.17.[67] behaviour
On 27/07/06, Sébastien Bernard <seb@...nkengul.org> wrote:
> seb@...nkengul.org a écrit :
> > I got a perfectly workable kernel 2.6.17.1 using mkinitramfs on my U60.
> >
> > Can you shed some lights on this dark corner of linux ?
> >
> > Seb
I can't shed any more light on it, but I can look too :o)
The original mailing of the patch to the list is below:
http://www.uwsg.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/0607.1/1694.html
[snip>
The prctl() system call should never allow to set "dumpable" to the
value 2. Especially not for non-privileged users.
This can be split into three cases:
1) running as root -- then core dumps will already be done as root,
and so prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 2) is not useful
2) running as non-root w/setuid-to-root -- this is the debatable case
3) running as non-root w/setuid-to-non-root -- then you definitely
do NOT want "dumpable" to get set to 2 because you have the
privilege escalation vulnerability
<snip]
Is it that something else is misbehaving and trying to dump core as root?
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