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Message-Id: <1156371603.6720.101.camel@localhost.localdomain>
Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2006 15:20:03 -0700
From: Kylene Jo Hall <kjhall@...ibm.com>
To: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@...ck.org>
Cc: linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM ML <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Dave Safford <safford@...ibm.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ibm.com>, Serge Hallyn <sergeh@...ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/7] SLIM main patch
On Wed, 2006-08-23 at 16:41 -0400, Benjamin LaHaise wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 01:35:56PM -0700, Kylene Jo Hall wrote:
> > Example: The current process is running at the USER level and writing to
> > a USER file in /home/user/. The process then attempts to read an
> > UNTRUSTED file. The current process will become UNTRUSTED and the read
> > allowed to proceed but first write access to all USER files is revoked
> > including the ones it has open.
>
> Don't threads share file tables? What is preventing malicious code from
> starting another thread which continues writing to the file that the
> revoke attempt is made on?
Well if they do share file tables then revoking write access from the
file in the file table will revoke access for all threads. It looks
like sharing or copying the file table is based on a flag to the clone
call and we are looking into whether you could exploit that situation.
Thanks,
Kylie
>
> -ben
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