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Message-Id: <1156425192.8506.167.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil>
Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2006 09:13:12 -0400
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...l.org>
Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Alan Cox <alan@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Subject: [patch 1/1] selinux: fix tty locking
Take tty_mutex when accessing ->signal->tty in selinux code.
Noted by Alan Cox. Longer term, we are looking at refactoring the code to provide better encapsulation of the tty layer, but this is a simple fix that addresses the immediate bug.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 ++++-
1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5d1b8c7..4b0f904 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1711,10 +1711,12 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_fi
{
struct avc_audit_data ad;
struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
- struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty;
+ struct tty_struct *tty;
struct fdtable *fdt;
long j = -1;
+ mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
+ tty = current->signal->tty;
if (tty) {
file_list_lock();
file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
@@ -1734,6 +1736,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_fi
}
file_list_unlock();
}
+ mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
-
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