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Message-ID: <ef72t3$5om$2@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu> Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2006 23:04:03 +0000 (UTC) From: daw@...berkeley.edu (David Wagner) To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [patch] remove MNT_NOEXEC check for PROT_EXEC mmaps Denis Vlasenko wrote: >If attacker has malicious loaders on the system, >the situation is already sort of hopeless. Makes sense. Of course, nothing prevents an attacker from introducing malicious loaders, since the loader is an unprivileged user-level program. >Stas, I think noexec mounts are meant to prevent >_accidental_ execution of binaries/libs from that >filesystem. Think VFAT partition here, where all >files have execute bits set. Ok. That justification makes much more sense to me. Thanks. So it's not really about preventing a malicious attacker from executing a program on a noexec partition; it's about mischance rather than malice. That suggests that the question to Stas should be: Do these programs that you're trying to make work count as example of accidental execution of binaries on the tmpfs, or are they deliberate execution knowing full well that the noexec flag is set and damn the consequences? (If that makes any sense.) >If user wants to execute binary blob from that fs >bad enough, he will do it. Maybe just by >copying file first to /tmp. Right. Agreed. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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