linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/6] MODSIGN: Kernel module signing

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Message-Id: <200702152034.l1FKYS93012172@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Date:	Thu, 15 Feb 2007 15:34:28 -0500
From:	Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
To:	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>
Cc:	Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
	torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, herbert.xu@...hat.com,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, arjan@...radead.org,
	linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] MODSIGN: Kernel module signing

On Wed, 14 Feb 2007 22:14:53 PST, Andreas Gruenbacher said:
> I agree, that's really what should happen. We solve this by marking modules as
> supported, partner supported, or unsupported, but in an "insecure" way, so
> partners and users could try to fake the support status of a module and/or
> remove status flags from Oopses, and cryptography wouldn't save us.

Where cryptography *can* save you is that a partner or user can't fake a
'Suse Supported' signature without access to the Suse private key.

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