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Message-Id: <200702152055.l1FKtfTY012824@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2007 15:55:41 -0500
From: Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
To: Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, herbert.xu@...hat.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, arjan@...radead.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] MODSIGN: Kernel module signing
On Wed, 14 Feb 2007 23:13:45 EST, Dave Jones said:
> One argument in its favour is aparently Red Hat isn't the only vendor
> with something like this. I've not investigated it, but I hear rumours
> that suse has something similar. Having everyone using the same code
> would be a win for obvious reasons.
Another argument in its favor is that it actually allows the kernel to
implement *real* checking of module licenses and trumps all the proposals
to deal with MODULE_LICENSE("GPL\0Haha!"). A vendor (or user) that wants
to be *sure* that only *really really* GPL modules are loaded can simply
refuse to load unsigned modules - and then refuse to sign a module until
after they had themselves visited the source's website, verified that the
source code was available under GPL, and so on.
Remember - the GPL is about the availability of the source. And at modprobe
time, the source isn't available. So you're left with two options:
1) Trust the binary to not lie to you about its license.
2) Ask a trusted 3rd party (usually, the person/distro that built the kernel)
whether they've verified the claim that it's really GPL.
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