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Open Source and information security mailing list archives
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Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2007 09:33:29 -0400 (EDT) From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> To: David Lang <david.lang@...italinsight.com> cc: Rob Meijer <capibara@...all.nl>, Karl MacMillan <kmacmill@...hat.com>, John Johansen <jjohansen@...e.de>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: AppArmor FAQ On Wed, 18 Apr 2007, David Lang wrote: > SELinux is designed to be able to make the box safe against root, AA is > designed to let the admin harden exposed apps without having to think about > the other things on the system. This is not correct. SELinux was designed as an access control framework which allows various security models to be composed in a controlled and consistent manner, covering all security-relevant interactions in the system. The type enforcement model included with it provides a means to address both integrity and confidentiality requirements. It _can_ protect you against root, if that's what you want (in fact, the Russell Coker "play box" was online for many years with a published root password), but it does not have to. Indeed, since Fedora Core 3, the default SELinux policy has been "targeted", which is aimed at confining exposed applications. - James -- James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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