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Date: Sat, 26 May 2007 15:58:50 -0700 (PDT) From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> To: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook --- Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de> wrote: > On Friday 25 May 2007 21:06, Casey Schaufler wrote: > > --- Jeremy Maitin-Shepard <jbms@....edu> wrote: > > > ... > > > Well, my point was exactly that App Armor doesn't (as far as I know) do > > > anything to enforce the argv[0] convention, > > > > Sounds like an opportunity for improvement then. > > Jeez, what argv[0] convention are you both talking about? >From the exec(3) man page: "The first argument, by convention, should point to the file name associated with the file being executed." since the man page calls it a convention, so do I. > argv[0] is not guaranteed to have any association with the > name of the executable. Feel free to have any discussion > about argv[0] you want, but *please* keep it away from > AppArmor, which really has nothing to do with it. As I pointed out, if you wanted to trust the argv[0] value (which I understand AppArmor makes no claims about) and you wanted to use the argv[0] value to determine application behavior (which several people claim is a Bad Idea) you could use Name Based Access Control to provide different access to the common binary. As I pointed out before, that's a lot of "if's". > It would be nice if you could stop calling argv[0] checks ``name-based access > > control'': from the point of view of the kernel no access control is > involved, and even application-level argv[0] based access control makes no > sense whatsoever. Fair enough, I don't believe that an argv[0] check ought to be used as a security mechanism. I am not convinced that everyone would agree with us. Casey Schaufler casey@...aufler-ca.com - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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