linux-kernel - Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode

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Message-ID: <9d732d950705261608j4bc72cd4s4378df9848101c84@mail.gmail.com>
Date:	Sun, 27 May 2007 08:08:56 +0900
From:	"Toshiharu Harada" <haradats@...il.com>
To:	"James Morris" <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc:	"Kyle Moffett" <mrmacman_g4@....com>, casey@...aufler-ca.com,
	"Andreas Gruenbacher" <agruen@...e.de>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook

2007/5/27, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>:
> On Sat, 26 May 2007, Kyle Moffett wrote:
> > AppArmor).  On the other hand, if you actually want to protect the _data_,
> > then tagging the _name_ is flawed; tag the *DATA* instead.
>
> Bingo.
>
> (This is how traditional Unix DAC has always functioned, and is what
> SELinux does: object labeling).

Object labeling (or labeled security) looks simple and straight forward way,
but it's not.

(1) Object labeling has a assumption that labels are always properly
defined and maintained. This can not be easily achieved.
(2) Also, assigning a label is something like inventing and assigning
a *new* name (label name) to objects which can cause flaws.

 I'm not saying labeled security or SELinux is wrong.  I just wanted to
remind that  the important part is the "process" not the "result". :-)

-- 
Toshiharu Harada
haradats@...il.com
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