linux-kernel - Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

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Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.64.0706211722440.31603@asgard.lang.hm>
Date:	Thu, 21 Jun 2007 17:28:57 -0700 (PDT)
From:	david@...g.hm
To:	Joshua Brindle <method@...icmethod.com>
cc:	Lars Marowsky-Bree <lmb@...e.de>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
	Crispin Cowan <crispin@...ell.com>, Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>,
	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>, jjohansen@...e.de,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation,
 pathname matching

On Thu, 21 Jun 2007, Joshua Brindle wrote:

> Lars Marowsky-Bree wrote:
>>  On 2007-06-21T16:59:54, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov> wrote:
>>  <snip>
>>
>> 
>> >  Um, no.  It might not be able to directly open files via that path, but
>> >  showing that it can never read or write your mail is a rather different
>> >  matter.
>> > 
>>
>>  Yes. Your use case is different than mine.
>> 
>
> So.. your use case is what? If an AA user asked you to protect his mail from 
> his browser I'm sure you'd truthfully answer "no, we can't do that but we can 
> protect the path to your mail from your browser".. I think not. One need only 
> look at the wonderful marketing literature for AA to see what you are telling 
> people it can do, and your above statement isn't consistent with that, sorry.

remember, the policies define a white-list

so if a hacker wants to have mozilla access the mail files he needs to get 
some other process on the sysstem to create a link or move a file to a 
path that mozilla does have access to. until that is done there is no way 
for mozilla to access the mail through the filesystem.

other programs could be run that would give mozilla access to the mail 
contents, but it would be through some other path that the policy 
permitted mozilla accessing in the first place.

David Lang
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