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Message-Id: <200706271537.10566.agruen@suse.de>
Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2007 15:37:10 +0200
From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...e.de>
To: Kyle Moffett <mrmacman_g4@....com>
Cc: John Johansen <jjohansen@...e.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 00/44] AppArmor security module overview
On Wednesday 27 June 2007 12:58, Kyle Moffett wrote:
> I seem to recall you could actually end up racing and building a path
> to the file in those directories as "a/d/0/3" or some other path at
> which it never even remotely existed. I'd love to be wrong,
Cheer up, you recall wrong.
> but I can't help but see this problem in any reverse-pathname-generation
> proposal which gets the locking right.
Have a look at how __d_path() is implemented (with the fixes): It takes the
dcache_lock, and the vfsmount_lock where necessary, and this ensures that the
pathname can't change under it, neither because of a rename nor unlink nor
remount. The pathname computed is *exactly* the name the file has at that
specific point time.
A few more details about how pathnames work are explained in the tech doc at:
http://forge.novell.com/modules/xfcontent/downloads.php/apparmor/LKML_Submission-May_07
Andreas
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