linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/3] core_pattern: cleaned up repost/continuing post of core

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Message-ID: <20070729121444.GA9644@hmsreliant.homelinux.net>
Date:	Sun, 29 Jul 2007 08:14:44 -0400
From:	Neil Horman <nhorman@...driver.com>
To:	Eugene Teo <eteo@...hat.com>
Cc:	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
	jeremy@...p.org, martin.pitt@...ntu.com, wwoods@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] core_pattern: cleaned up repost/continuing post of core_pattern enhancements

On Sun, Jul 29, 2007 at 06:40:43PM +0800, Eugene Teo wrote:
> Neil Horman wrote:
> > Ok, here we go
> > 
> > As promised, I'm reposting the core_pattern enhancements I've done over the past
> > few days.  These three patches replace and conintue the work contained in the
> > following patches, and can replace them:
> > update-coredump-path-in-kernel-to-not-check-coredump-rlim-if-core_pattern-is-a-pipe.patch
> > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe.patch
> > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix.patch
> > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix-2.patch
> > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix-2-fix.patch
> > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-sparc64-fix.patch
> > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix-2-sparc64-fix.patch
> [...]
> 
> You may want to improve your patches with style-related changes, including
> removing trailing spaces, using tabs instead of spaces, and defining pointers
> like char *ptr instead of char * ptr.
> 
I assume this is just a general comment, since as far as I can see, I've
followed those guidelines.

> Also, it is probably good to think how we can "drop privileges" while piping
> the core dump output to an external program. A malicious user can potentially
> use it as a possible backdoor since anything that is executed by "|program" will
> be executed with root privileges.
> 
It was my understanding that apport already did this.

Thanks and Regards
Neil

> Eugene

-- 
/***************************************************
 *Neil Horman
 *Software Engineer
 *Red Hat, Inc.
 *nhorman@...driver.com
 *gpg keyid: 1024D / 0x92A74FA1
 *http://pgp.mit.edu
 ***************************************************/
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