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Message-ID: <20070827152817.GA31632@vino.hallyn.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Aug 2007 10:28:17 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To: Adrian Bunk <bunk@...nel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@...nel.org>, chrisw@...s-sol.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [2.6 patch] remove securebits
Quoting Adrian Bunk (bunk@...nel.org):
> On Mon, Aug 27, 2007 at 10:09:42AM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Quoting Adrian Bunk (bunk@...nel.org):
> > > On Fri, Aug 24, 2007 at 08:50:10PM -0700, Andrew Morgan wrote:
> > > >
> > > > FWIW, in the mm kernel, I've actually already removed them when one
> > > > configures without capabilities.
> > > >
> > > > http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/akpm/patches/2.6/2.6.23-rc3/2.6.23-rc3-mm1/broken-out/v3-file-capabilities-alter-behavior-of-cap_setpcap.patch
> > > >
> > > > Other than writing a custom module, so far as I can tell, there is/was
> > > > no way to set them anyway.
> > > >
> > > > I'd obviously prefer to wait for the mm-merge process to complete and
> > > > minimize the churn in this area, but I basically agree that the bits as
> > > > implemented are pretty useless in their current form. In a per-process
> > > > mode (with filesystem capability support) they are much more useful...
> > >
> > > It was in the tree for nine years (sic) without a single user...
> >
> > That's because without file capabilities there was no way for a process
> > to retain capabilities across exec, so not having a privileged root user
> > was simply not workable.
> >
> > > Are you only improving a dead horse, or do you also have a rider for the
> > > improved dead horse?
> >
> > It will allow process trees to run with strict capabilities, without a
> > root user which automatically gains full capabilities. That wasn't
> > possible without file capabilities, since there was no way for processes
> > to retain capabilities across exec. Now that we have file capabilities,
> > it is feasible, and it certainly is useful.
>
> I didn't question that the dead horse gets improved, but where's the
> rider?
>
> A user of the improved securebits has to be submitted for inclusion in
> the kernel.
The user would be userspace...
Unless by 'the user' you actually mean the patch itself which will allow
the setting of secure_noroot per-process. I don't know for sure, but
suspect Andrew might like to wait until file capabilities make it into
and stabilize in Linus' tree before going on with that.
-serge
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