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Message-Id: <200709301939.57542.ak@suse.de>
Date: Sun, 30 Sep 2007 19:39:57 +0200
From: Andi Kleen <ak@...e.de>
To: Joshua Brindle <method@...icmethod.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, casey@...aufler-ca.com,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Paul Moore <paul.moore@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Version 3 (2.6.23-rc8) Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel
> CIPSO is supported on SELinux as well.
That's no reason to extend that design mistake.
> It certainly has uses where IPSec
> is excessive. One example is someone I talked to recently that basically
> has a set of blade systems connected with a high speed backplane that
> looks like a network interface. CIPSO is useful in this case because
> they can't afford the overhead of IPSec but need to transfer the level
> of the connection to the other machines. The backplane is a trusted
> network and that isn't a dangerous assumption in this case.
If one of the boxes gets broken in all are compromised this way?
> CIPSO also lets systems like SELinux and SMACK talk to other trusted
> systems (eg., trusted solaris) in a way they understand.
Perhaps, but is the result secure? I have severe doubts.
> I don't
> regularly support CIPSO as I believe IPSec labeling is more useful in
> more situations but that doesn't mean CIPSO is never useful.
Security that isn't secure is not really useful. You might as well not
bother.
-Andi
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