linux-kernel - Re: [patch 1/2] [RFC] Simple tamper-proof device filesystem.

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Date:	Tue, 18 Dec 2007 11:26:21 +0900
From:	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>
To:	"\"\\\"Serge E. Hallyn\\\"\"" <serue@...ibm.com>
Cc:	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	Linux Containers <containers@...ts.osdl.org>
Subject: Re: [patch 1/2] [RFC] Simple tamper-proof device filesystem.

Hello.

Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> But your requirements are to ensure that an application accessing a
> device at a well-known location get what it expect.

Yes. That's the purpose of this filesystem.

> So then the main quesiton is still the one I think Al had asked - what
> keeps a rogue CAP_SYS_MOUNT process from doing
> mount --bind /dev/hda1 /dev/null ?

Excuse me, but I guess you meant "mount --bind /dev/ /root/" or something
because mount operation requires directories.
MAC can prevent a rogue CAP_SYS_MOUNT process from doing
"mount --bind /dev/ /root/".
For example, regarding TOMOYO Linux, you need to give
"allow_mount /dev/ /root/ --bind 0" permission
to permit "mount --bind /dev/ /root/" request.

Did you mean "ln -s /dev/hda1 /dev/null" or "ln /dev/hda1 /dev/null"?
No problem. MAC can prevent such requests too.

Regards.
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