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Message-Id: <200712180226.lBI2QL1d020811@www262.sakura.ne.jp> Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2007 11:26:21 +0900 From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp> To: "\"\\\"Serge E. Hallyn\\\"\"" <serue@...ibm.com> Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Linux Containers <containers@...ts.osdl.org> Subject: Re: [patch 1/2] [RFC] Simple tamper-proof device filesystem. Hello. Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > But your requirements are to ensure that an application accessing a > device at a well-known location get what it expect. Yes. That's the purpose of this filesystem. > So then the main quesiton is still the one I think Al had asked - what > keeps a rogue CAP_SYS_MOUNT process from doing > mount --bind /dev/hda1 /dev/null ? Excuse me, but I guess you meant "mount --bind /dev/ /root/" or something because mount operation requires directories. MAC can prevent a rogue CAP_SYS_MOUNT process from doing "mount --bind /dev/ /root/". For example, regarding TOMOYO Linux, you need to give "allow_mount /dev/ /root/ --bind 0" permission to permit "mount --bind /dev/ /root/" request. Did you mean "ln -s /dev/hda1 /dev/null" or "ln /dev/hda1 /dev/null"? No problem. MAC can prevent such requests too. Regards. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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