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Message-ID: <20071218025329.GA12429@vino.hallyn.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2007 20:53:33 -0600
From: serge@...lyn.com
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@...ibm.com>,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Linux Containers <containers@...ts.osdl.org>
Subject: Re: [patch 1/2] [RFC] Simple tamper-proof device filesystem.
Quoting Tetsuo Handa (penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp):
> Hello.
>
> Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > But your requirements are to ensure that an application accessing a
> > device at a well-known location get what it expect.
>
> Yes. That's the purpose of this filesystem.
>
>
> > So then the main quesiton is still the one I think Al had asked - what
> > keeps a rogue CAP_SYS_MOUNT process from doing
> > mount --bind /dev/hda1 /dev/null ?
>
> Excuse me, but I guess you meant "mount --bind /dev/ /root/" or something
> because mount operation requires directories.
Nope, try
touch /root/hda1
ls -l /root/hda1
mount --bind /dev/hda1 /root/hda1
ls -l /root/hda1
But I see tomoyo prevents that
> MAC can prevent a rogue CAP_SYS_MOUNT process from doing
> "mount --bind /dev/ /root/".
> For example, regarding TOMOYO Linux, you need to give
> "allow_mount /dev/ /root/ --bind 0" permission
> to permit "mount --bind /dev/ /root/" request.
Ok, that answers my question. Thanks.
(I won't go into "who gets to say allow_mount" :)
> Did you mean "ln -s /dev/hda1 /dev/null" or "ln /dev/hda1 /dev/null"?
> No problem. MAC can prevent such requests too.
Then it sounds like this filesystem is something Tomoyo can use.
thanks,
-serge
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